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The Relevance of Fresh Investment to the 
Characterization of Corporate 
Distributions and Adjustments 
GLENN E. COVEN.:. 
Introduction 
In our commercially complex world, a desired financial result quite 
commonly can be achieved through a variety of routes. Too frequently, 
the federal income tax consequences of obtaining the result vary con-
siderably depending upon the route chosen, a highly undesirable result. 
The imposition of unequal tax burdens on similarly situated taxpayers 
is unfair. Moreover, the potential for disparate treatment injects eco-
nomically wasteful tax gamesmanship into relatively routine commercial 
activities. 
In many instances, inconsistent tax burdens are the unavoidable con-
sequences of the very effort to tax a complex economy. A taxing system, 
to be comprehensible, must categorize transactions. A transaction which 
by chance or design approaches a prescribed boundary may be taxed very 
differently from its mirror image approaching tl1e same boundary from 
the other side. Many such anomalies within our taxing system, however, 
are entirely avoidable. For reasons of historical accident or excessive 
administrative zeal, alternative forms of economically identical trans-
actions simply may have been analyzed differently, their similarities 
ignored.1 The taxing system can be made more rational and simpler by 
identifying such anomalies and eliminating them from the law. 
* GLENN E. CoVEN (A.B. 1963, Swarthmore; LL.B. 1966, Columbia) is Pr~ 
fessor of Law, University of Tennessee. The author expresses his appreciation 
to his colleague Professor AMY HEss for her helpful criticism of an earlier draft 
of this article. 
1 The inconsistent tax consequences considered in this article are the product of 
faulty judicial and administrative interpretation of broad or ambiguous statutory 
language. There are other sources of inconsistent treatment, most notably, express 
statutory mandate. Congress may prescribe inconsistent tax treatment for com-
parable activities either to achieve a nontax objective or by seeming inadvertence. 
For an example of the former, compare the favorable consequences of exploiting 
patents provided by § 1235 with the consequences of transactions in intellectual 
properties governed by§ 1221{3). Inadvertent inconsistencies arise, with increas-
ing frequency, from efforts to correct specific manifestations of broader problems 
while leaving the basic problem and its other manifestations untouched. For a 
419 
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This article examines a financial transaction that is commonplace in 
the life of many corporations: a partial shift of corporate ownership from 
an existing stockholder group to new investors that is accompanied by 
a withdrawal of investment by one or more members of the old group. 
Three of the more common ways of achieving this result are examined 
here: the Zenz redemption, a statutory merger or consolidation accom-
panied by a distribution of boot, and a liquidation-reincorporation. 2 Al-
though not compelled by any provision of the Internal Revenue Code, 
the income tax consequences to shareholders receiving corporate dis-
tributions incident to such transactions are likely to be very different 
depending upon the route chosen. The differing treatments have evolved 
because neither the courts nor the Commissioner has given due regard 
to the relevance of the fresh investment from the new investor group to 
the characterization of the disposition of corporate interests by the old 
stockholder group. 
This article first demonstrates the proper relevance of fresh invest-
ment to the tax consequences of the partially withdrawing stockholder 
in the context of a simple redemption. It then shows that consistent 
treatment of fresh investment in the three transactional formats both 
produces consistent results among comparable transactions, thereby en-
hancing the rationality of the taxing system, and yields superior results 
to the participants in each form of transaction viewed in isolation. 
The Problem in General 
One of the more fruitful sources of inconsistent tax consequences 
under the Internal Revenue Code is the need to distinguish for income 
tax purposes the disposition of an interest in property from the exploita-
tion of the interest in an income producing activity. The Code gen-
erally assumes a sharp distinction between these categories and imposes 
widely differing income tax burdens on financial receipts from the seem-
ingly dichotomous activities. 3 Dispositive transactions are taxed quite 
treatment of one such effort, see Coven, Liabilities in Excess of Basis: Focht, 
Section 357(c)(3) and the Assignment of Income, 58 OR. L. REV. 61 (1979). 
2 There are other techniques for accomplishing such a shift of investment. For 
example, the assets of an existing corporation, together with fresh investment, may 
be transferred to a new corporation in exchange for stock and, to the withdrawing 
stockholders, cash. The consequences of such a transaction are governed by § 351. 
For a recent article which applies to § 351 a dispositive transaction analysis similar 
to that used here, see Tillinghast and Paully, The Effect of the Collateral Issuance 
of Stock or Securities on the "Control" Requirement of Section 351, 37 TAX L. 
REV. 251 (1982). 
a A few recently enacted provisions of the Code are based on the contrary as-
sumption, namely, that a single transaction may contain elements of both a sale 
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lightly. The proceeds of a disposition are taxed only to the extent that 
they exceed the taxpayer's remaining investment in the property interest:' 
Moreover, the taxable amount is frequently eligible for the highly favor-
able rate of tax imposed on capital gains. G On the other hand, receipts 
from the exploitation of property are fully subject to tax and are taxed 
at ordinary income rates. 0 
Regrettably, the world that we attempt to tax fails to draw this distinc-
tion. Complete dispositions and mere exploitations are at best points on 
a continuum of commercial activities. Consequently, the lines drawn in 
the various contexts in which this distinction carries controlling signifi-
cance have not been entirely satisfactory and have produced a dispro-
portionately large amount of controversy.7 
The inherent arbitrariness of the distinction between gain or loss on 
a disposition and a return on a retained interest is nowhere more evident 
than in the rules that apply the distinction to corporate distributions.8 A 
sale of a portion of a stock interest in a corporation to an unrelated per-
son necessarily produces a pro tanto reduction in the seller's continuing 
interest in the corporation and thus is treated as a disposition.° Con-
versely, a mere pro rata distribution with respect to a retained stock 
and an exploitation. For example, § 1253 provides that in the context of what 
otherwise constitutes the sale of a franchise or trademark, the receipt of payments 
contingent upon productivity or use are denied capital gains treatment. Such 
bifurcation of a single transaction, however, remains the rare exception. 
4 I.R.C. § 1001. 
5 I.R.C. §§ 1201, 1202 and 1221. In general, gain of a noncorporate taxpayer 
on a disposition of property is taxed at a rate equal to 40% of the otherwise 
applicable tax rate. 
o See I.R.C. § 61. 
7 One of the currently more notorious controversies surrounds the distinction 
between installment sales and financing leases. Taxpayers and the Service have 
quarrelled for decades over whether a manufacturer or financial intermediary has 
sold or merely leased property to the user. See, e.g., Starr's Estate v. Commis-
sioner, 274 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1959) and Rev. Proc. 75-21, 1975-1 C.B. 715, 
modified, Rev. Proc. 76-30, 1976-2 C.B. 647, Rev. Proc. 79-48, 1979-2 C.B. 529, 
Rev. Proc. 81-71, 1981-2 C.B. 731. Considerable confusion was added to this 
branch of the controversy when Congress provided that for the purpose of per-
mitting trafficking in the tax benefits of the Accelerated Cost Recovery System, 
transactions that everyone agreed did not constitute leases henceforth would be 
regarded as leases. I.R.C. § 168(f) (8). 
8 Prophetically, the Supreme Court's first confrontation with the definition of 
income for tax purposes arose in the context of a corporate distribution of a stock 
dividend which the Court held was not taxable. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 
189 (1920). In dissent, Justice Brandeis argued that the distribution was the 
functional equivalent of a cash dividend and reinvestment and should be taxed 
in the same manner. 
9 I.R.C. § 1001. Of course, it is always possible to pretend to sell stock, in which 
event the purported disposition may be disregarded. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 267(a) (1) 
and 1091. 
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interest is usually a return on that stock investment, a dividend.10 A sale 
of stock to the issuing corporation straddles these categories and requires 
arbitrary characterization. While other solutions might be possible, 11 
the Code recognizes that such a redemption may more nearly resemble 
either a disposition or a dividend and thus characterizes a redemption as 
a disposition or a dividend, depending on which category the particular 
transaction more closely resembles. 
For corporate distributions which occur in isolation-for simple re-
demptions not involving multiple corporations, for example-a reason-
able measure of consistency of characterization has been achieved for 
the great majority of transactions. Redemptions deemed to be disposi-
tions are distinguished from those that are not under the largely mechani-
cal safe harbor rules of section 302 (b). Since a disposition should result 
in a reduction of a taxpayer's continuing ownership interest, while a 
dividend typically does not, section 302 provides that a redemption is 
taxed as a disposition only if the effect of the redemption is to materially 
diminish the redeemed stockholder's continuing interest in the corpora-
tion. Section 302(b) (2), for example, specifies that a stockholder's 
proportionate interest is regarded as materially reduced if it is less than 
80 percent of the proportionate interest held prior to the redemption.12 
10 Section 316{a) defines a dividend as any distribution of property from a 
corporation to its stockholders to the extent of the corporation's earnings and 
profits. "Earnings and profits" is not comprehensively defined but generally 
corresponds to the accounting concept of retained earnings. Under§§ 301 (a) and 
(c) (1), to the extent that a corporate distribution is a dividend as so defined, it 
is fully taxed at ordinary income rates, unless the distribution is governed by a 
more specific section of the Code. Thus, for example, a distribution in the form 
of a stock redemption which meets the requirements of § 302(b) is treated as a 
sale (I.R.C. § 301 (a)), not as a dividend. 
11 For a summary of several possible approaches to changing the present method 
of taxing redemptions, see ALI, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT 100-29 (Tent. 
Draft No. 2, 1979) (Subchapter C, Corporate Distributions). 
12 Actually, of course, the requirements of § 302(b) (2) are a bit more com-
plicated: 
(b) REDEMPTIONS TREATED AS EXCHANGES.- ... 
(2) SUBSTANTIALLY DISPROPORTIONATE REDEMPTION OF SfOCK.-
(A) IN GENERAL.-Subsection (a) shall apply if the distribution is 
substantially disproportionate with respect to the shareholder. 
(B) LIMITATION.-This paragraph shall not apply unless immedi-
ately after the redemption the shareholder owns less than 50 percent of 
the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote. 
(C) DEFINITIONs.-For purposes of this paragraph, the distribution 
is substantially disproportionate if-
(i) the ratio which the voting stock of the corporation owned 
by the shareholder immediately after the redemption bears to all of 
the voting stock of the corporation at such time, 
is less than 80 percent of-
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While plainly arbitrary, this "substantially disproportionate., test of sec-
tion 302(b)(2) possesses the twin virtues of relative clarity and sim-
plicity and eliminates much of the confusion that existed under prior 
law.13 
(ii) the ratio which the voting stock of the corporation owned 
by the shareholder immediately before the redemption bears to all 
of the voting stock of the corporation at such time. 
For purposes of this paragraph, no distribution shall be treated as sub-
stantially disproportionate unless the shareholder's ownership of the 
common stock of the corporation (whether voting or nonvoting), after 
and before redemption also meets the 80 percent requirement of the pre-
ceding sentence. For purposes of the preceding sentence, if there is more 
than one class of common stock, the determination shall be made by 
reference to fair market value. 
(D) SERIES OF REDEMPTIONS.-This paragraph shall not apply to 
any redemption made pursuant to a plan the purpose or effect of which 
is a series of redemptions resulting in a distribution which (in the aggre-
gate) is not substantially disproportionate with respect to the shareholder. 
Moreover, § 302(c) (1) provides that in computing stock ownership, the attri-
bution rules of§ 318(a) are applicable. The complications added by stock attri-
bution are not of present concern. 
The application of the substantially disproportionate rule is illustrated as follows. 
Assume that individual A owns 40 of the 100 outstanding shares of a. single class 
of stock in a corporation and that 10 of those shares are redeemed. A's percentage 
interest in the corporation falls from 40% (40/100) to 33% (30/90). Since 
33% is more than 80% of 40%, the redemption does not meet the safe harbor 
rule of § 302(b) (2). Unless the redemption meets one of the other tests of 
§ 302(b), the distribution is taxed as a dividend. 
Section 302(b) sets forth three other tests of general application for avoiding 
dividend treatment, none of which is of particular interest here. The complete 
termination of a stockholder's interest in a corporation avoids dividend treatment 
under § 302(b)(3). A redemption of all of a stockholder's shares would always 
satisfy the substantially disproportionate test were it not for the stock attribution 
rules. The advantage of the complete termination provision is that, subject to 
several lengthy and complex rules, the family attribution rules arc waived for the 
purpose of determining whether the redemption has completely terminated the 
stockholder's interest. I.R.C. § 302(c) (2). 
The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 
Stat. 324 [hereinafter cited as TEFRA], eliminated the rules allowing distributions 
in partial liquidation to be taxed as dispositions under § 331 (see § 346(a) before 
its amendment by TEFRA), but added a new exception from dividend treatment 
in § 302(b)(4) that is designed to continue sales treatment for distributions to 
non-corporate stockholders incident to such transactions. TEFRA, § § 222 (c) and 
(d). The definition of a partial liquidation, now contained in § 302(e), remains 
essentially unchanged and does not normally encompass any of the transactions 
considered herein. 
Finally, § 302(b)(1) provides a catch-all rule that dividend treatment is not 
imposed "if the redemption is not essentially equivalent to a dividend." The scope 
of this general test is still emerging, although the Supreme Court has required that 
the redemption cause a "meaningful reduction" in stock ownership, taking into 
account the stock attribution rules. United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970). 
13 For brief histories of the confused pre-1954 caselaw, see B. BITTKER & 
J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CoRPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 
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Corporate distributions often do not occur in isolation, however, but 
are the mere accompaniments of more fundamental adjustments to the 
capital structure of the redeeming corporation. The rational application 
of the substantially disproportionate test has proven elusive in cases in 
which distributions are only parts of larger transactions in which new 
investors are introduced. The complicating factor in such a case is that 
the fresh investment independently alters the interest in the corporation 
of the recipient of the distribution. Surprisingly enough at this date, the 
relevance of this independent expansion of the value of the corporation 
to the characterization of the concurrent distribution has not been 
established. 
Consider, for example, a corporation that has a net worth of $1 million 
and is equally owned by two unrelated stockholders. Wishing, perhaps, 
to retire from the active management of the business and harvest a part 
of the gains in their investments, the shareholders have located an indi-
vidual willing to invest $600,000 in the corporation. As part of the 
transaction in which the new investor is brought in, each shareholder 
will convert 40 percent of his investment to cash, leaving each with 25 
percent and the new investor with 50 percent of the corporation's stock. 
The most expeditious manner in which such a substitution of investment 
could occur would be a sale of 40 percent of the outstanding stock of the 
corporation directly from the old stockholders to the new for $400,000, 
accompanied by the latter's investment of $200,000 in the corporation. 
In a no tax world, or perhaps even in a world free of the corporate in-
come tax, the parties typically would not seek a more complex solution 
to their desired objective. In our world, however, very substantial income 
tax advantages can accrue to both buyer and seller if they choose to deal, 
not with each other, but rather with the corporation.14 Thus, the parties 
likely will prefer to cause the corporation to redeem the holdings to be 
liquidated while the new investor acquires only newly issued stock. If 
1i1i 9.01-.03 (4th ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as BITTKER & EusTICE]; Dean, Re-
demptions: Dividend or Capital Gain; Death Taxes, Related Corporations, 13 
N.Y.U. lNST. ON FED. TAX'N 547 (1955). 
14 On direct sale of stock, the seller is taxed, normally at capital gains rates, on 
his gain in the particular shares sold. The sale has no effect at the corporate level. 
A redemption given sale treatment produces precisely the same tax to the seller. 
However, the redemption accomplishes a distribution of earnings and profits. See 
I.R.C. § 312(3); Rev. Rul. 79-376, 1979-C.B. 133. This reduction in earn-
ings and profits may benefit all continuing stockholders, most prominently by re-
ducing the amount of any subsequent distributions that may be taxed as dividends. 
Perhaps most importantly, to the extent of the redemption, the buyers arc in effect 
acquiring an interest in the corporation through the use of the assets of the cor-
poration, but the buyers are not taxed on the value of the assets so used for their 
benefit. See Edenfield v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 13 (1952); Rev. Rul. 69-608, 
1969-2 C.B. 42. 
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each stockholder liquidates a portion of his investment through a distribu-
tion from the corporation, it becomes necessary to characterize the re-
demption under section 302(b) (2) as either a disposition of this portion 
or as a return on a continued investment, the equivalent of a dividend. 
For the purpose of making this determination, the Commissioner ap-
pears to be prepared to concede that the change in proportionate interest 
of each withdrawing shareholder should be calculated by comparing (a) 
his interest in the corporation prior to the purported redemptions and 
the issuance of stock to the new investor with (b) the interest held fol-
lowing these transactions. That is, the redemptions and the corporate 
sale will be integrated and effect will be given to the reduction in owner-
ship attributable to these transactions. Accordingly, the interest of each 
shareholder will be regarded as declining from 50 to 25 percent. Since 
this reduction in interest substantially exceeds the 20 percentage points 
required by the safe harbor rule of section 302(b) (2), tG the redemption 
will be treated as a sale subject to capital gains taxation. 
If the new investor is another corporation, the fresh investment could 
be obtained through some form of corporate combination, for example, 
a statutory merger or consolidation accompanied by distributions to the 
old stockholders. Assume the new investor is a corporation that has 
assets worth $600,000 and no liabilities. The new investor and the 
corporation discussed earlier might consolidate into a new corporation, 
C, under a plan providing for (a) the exchange of all stock of the new 
investor for 50 percent of the shares of C and (b) the exchange by each 
of the old shareholders of his stock for 25 percent of the C stock and 
$200,000 in cash. 
In this case, the Commissioner, with some backing from the courts, 
would take the position that the withdrawal of funds and consolidation 
cannot be integrated and that the change in ownership attributable to 
the consolidation must be disregarded in testing for dividend equivalence. 
Under this view, the proportionate interest of each old stockholder is 
deemed not to change at all, and the case is analyzed as though each of 
them owned 50 percent of a $1 million corporation before the transaction 
and afterwards owns 50 percent of a $600,000 corporation. The me-
chanical test of section 302(b) (2) is not met, according to the Ser-
vice, and, apparently, the distribution is taxed in a manner similar to the 
taxation of an ordinary dividend.16 Thus, notwithstanding that the re-
15 The reduction also meets the further requirement that the redeemed share-
holder own less than 50 percent of the voting stock immediately after the redemp-
tion. I.R.C. § 302(b)(2)(B). 
16 The taxation of distributions incident to reorganizations, or "boot," is gov-
erned by § 356. In testing for dividend equivalent under that section, however, 
the rules of § 302 are applied by analogy. See infra text accompanying notes 
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organization leaves the shareholder in precisely the same economic posi-
tion as the redemption assumed earlier, the consequences to him will be 
quite different. While capital gains treatment is relatively easy to obtain 
under the rules the Commissioner applies to a simple redemption, it is 
virtually impossible to obtain under the rules applied to an analogous 
reorganization. 
As a third alternative, the stockholders could cause their corporation 
to be completely liquidated, each receiving assets worth $500,000 in the 
liquidation, retaining $200,000 of the distributed assets, and contributing 
$300,000 of the assets to a new corporation in exchange for 25 percent 
of its stock. If as a part of the same transaction the new investor con-
tributes $600,000 to the new corporation in exchange for 50 percent of 
its stock, the parties will be left in the same positions that they would 
have occupied under the two forms of this transaction considered 
previously. 
Whether the corporate assets retained by the shareholders in the liqui-
dation-reincorporation will be treated as the equivalent of a dividend 
again depends on the effect given to the fresh investment. The Com-
missioner has argued that the fresh investment should not be integrated 
to any extent with the reincorporation and distribution and that each 
stockholder should be taxed as if he had received a distribution in the 
nature of a dividend from a continuing corporation. The courts, how-
ever, have not only integrated the transactions but have held that the 
presence of fresh investment requires that the shareholder be treated as 
having disposed of his prior investment, thus entitling him to capital gains 
taxation. 
Given the identity of financial result to the shareholder in each of these 
three forms of transactions, it would plainly be desirable for the federal 
income tax consequences of the partial withdrawal of investment to be as 
identical as the Code permits. An analysis of the proper significance of 
fresh investment to the characterization of the distribution to the share-
holder in each of these contexts indicates that none of the results presently 
obtained in these transactions is correct. In each, the fresh investment 
should be integrated with the withdrawal, but it is relevant to the char-
acterization of the withdrawal only to the extent the fresh investment is 
the functional equivalent of a disposition. As will be demonstrated, to 
the extent that the fresh investment exceeds the distribution to the old 
shareholder, the fresh investment is not relevant to either the character-
38-40. If reorganization boot is found to have the effect of a dividend, it is usually 
taxed in the same manner as an ordinary dividend. One significant difference is 
that the amount of boot subject to tax cannot exceed the stockholder's gain on the 
reorganization exchange. I.R.C. § 356(a)(2). That limitation is rarely of sig-
nificance in the transactions considered herein. 
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ization of the distribution or the finding of a reorganization. Accord-
ingly, whether the fresh investment comes as a direct investment in the 
existing corporation or by virtue of a statutory merger or consolidation, 
the interest of each old shareholder should be regarded as declining from 
50 to 30 percent. 
In the liquidation-reincorporation form of the transaction, the distribu-
tion to be characterized is the distribution in liquidation. It should be 
integrated with the subsequent reincorporation in determining whether 
the overall transaction constitutes a reorganization. In making this de-
termination, the fresh investment is not relevant to the application of the 
traditional continuity of interest test applied to all reorganizations.17 On 
the facts supposed, since each shareholder retains 60 percent of his prior 
investment as a continuing equity interest, the continuity of interest test is 
met. Accordingly, the transaction should be treated as an F reorganiza-
tion. Thus, the $200,000 retained by each old stockholder would be 
treated as a distribution of boot incident to a reorganization or as a re-
demption accompanying the reorganization, 18 and the shareholder should 
be taxed precisely as he was taxed in the other versions of the transaction. 
The Zenz Redemption 
The simplest situation in which a corporate distribution occurs in 
tandem with a fresh investment is a redemption coupled with a purchase 
of stock by the new investor from the old shareholder or the corporation. 
The 1954 ,Pecision of the Sixth Circuit in Zenz v. Quin/i'•,•an 10 is the 
starting point for the analysis here. Mrs. Zenz had inherited from her 
husband all outstanding shares of a corporation which had accumulated 
a substantial and perhaps excessive portion of its earnings. Mrs. Zenz 
wished to dispose completely of the corporation. She sold somewhat less 
than one half of her shares. Three weeks later the corporation redeemed 
the balance of her stock for an amount that approximated its earned 
surplus. The Commissioner evidently argued that the redemption must 
be characterized separately from the sale of stock and that because the 
effect of the postsale redemption was the same as if the redemption had 
preceded the sale, it should be subject to tax in the same manner.20 
17 See infra text accompanying notes 91-93. 
18 Whether distributions accompanying an F reorganization constitute reorgani-
zation boot or are to be taxed separately under §§ 301 and 302 remains in dispute. 
See infra text accompanying note 129. 
19 213 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1954). 
2 0 The position of the Commissioner is not described with particular clarity by 
either the court of appeals or the district court, whose opinion appears at 106 F. 
Supp. 57 (N.D. Ohio 1952). It does appear that the Commissioner relied in part 
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Since a presale redemption would not have altered the proportionate 
interest of a sole stockholder such as Mrs. Zenz, the Commissioner con-
cluded that the redemption was essentially the equivalent of a dividend. 
The Court of Appeals, however, held that a redemption that in fact com-
pletely terminated a stockholder's interest in a corporation could never 
be the equivalent of a dividend and thus sustained Mrs. Zenz's treatment 
of the sale and redemption as dispositions entitled to sales treatment. 
The court could have reached this result by agreeing that the redemp-
tion was a transaction to be tested separately from the stock sale but re-
jecting the Commissioner's rather strained reconstruction of the order of 
events. It is not entirely certain that the court intended to go any further 
than that. Nor at the time was the Commissioner prepared to read the 
Zenz opinion expansively. While he almost immediately announced his 
agreement with the decision, the retreat was limited to the particular facts 
of the case. 21 Nevertheless, the opinion suggested that under a step trans-
action analysis, the court had viewed the sale and redemption as a single, 
integrated transaction in determining whether the change in the stock-
holder's interest in the corporation was sufficient to avoid dividend 
equivalence. 22 
Whether intended in 1954 or not, the decision in Zenz v. Quinlivan 
has, by a series of incremental expansions of its reach, come to stand for 
the broader proposition. Just. seven years later, the Eighth Circuit was 
presented in United States v. Carey 2a with a similar transaction in which 
the parties had somewhat cavalierly reversed the order of events. Two 
equal stockholders caused their corporation to make a pro rata redemp-
tion of approximately one half of the stock of each, whereupon one of 
the stockholders sold his remaining shares to the other and a new in-
vestor. In the district court, the government sought to charge both stock-
holders with dividend income, but both taxpayers prevailed. The govern-
ment appealed only with respect to the stockholder who retained an 
interest in the corporation. It did not appeal the decision in favor of the 
upon the dearth of prior dividend distributions and the resulting accumulation of 
earnings in arguing that the transaction amounted to a circuitous attempt to dis-
tribute earnings in a manner essentially equivalent to a dividend. Id. at 61. How-
ever, in Revenue Ruling 77-226, 1977-2 C.B. 90, the Commissioner described the 
government's position in Zenz as set forth in the text. 
21 Rev. Rul. 54-458, 1954-2 C.B. 167. The "particular" facts stressed by the 
Commissioner were the sale preceding the redemption and the complete termina-
tion of interest. In the following year, the Commissioner extended his concur-
rence to cases arising under the 1954 Code. Rev. Rul. 55-745, 1955-2 C.B. 223. 
22 At several points in the appellate opinion, the court variously appears to 
address the separate redemption or the overall transaction as accomplishing the 
complete termination of Mrs. Zenz's interest. 
23 298 F.2d 531 (8th Cir. 1961). 
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terminated stockholder for the stated reason that his "interest in the cor-
poration was terminated as a result of the transaction in question." :H 
Following this concession, the Zenz doctrine has been extended to 
stand for the proposition that if a shareholder disposes of an interest in 
a corporation in two factually related steps, one being a sale and the other 
a redemption, those steps are integrated in applying section 302. Fur-
ther, if as a result of this integrated transaction the stockholder is left 
owning no stock in the corporation, the transaction is a complete termi-
nation of interest under section 302 (b) (3). As so extended, the doctrine 
is unquestionably proper. 
While this extension of the Zenz doctrine is not controversial, it is 
necessary, in order to appreciate the proper scope of the doctrine and its 
application to the transactions that are the subject of this article, to under-
stand why the results obtained through its application are correct. 
Two quite separate legal issues must be addressed in the application 
of the Zenz doctrine, or indeed any other manifestation of the step trans-
action analysis. The first concerns the level of factual relationship among 
the discrete steps that must exist before these steps will be regarded as 
components of an integrated whole in applying section 302. The requi-
site level has not been defined consistently.2~ In some instances, the 
courts have required an artificially strong relationship, such as a binding 
contract, before applying the step transaction doctrine, 26 while in other 
cases a surprisingly weak relationship has sufficed. 27 Generalization is 
thus hazardous at best, but most cases disclose a pragmatic, common 
sense approach. Where the steps are necessary to achieve the result 
sought by the parties, have been arranged in advance, and are executed 
during a relatively brief period of time in conformity to the original plan, 
24 Id. at 532 n.2. The enduring importance of Carey is attributable to this 
concession, although the court's disposition of the case before it is also of interest. 
If the redemption were not a dividend to the terminated stockholder, the court 
reasoned, the identical redemption could not be a dividend to the continuing 
stockholder. It held that the taxpayer before it was entitled to sales treatment. 
Since the interest of the continuing stockholder actually increased as a result of 
the overall transaction, this decision is obviously wrong and may in part have been 
responsible for the reluctance of the Commissioner to extend the Zenz doctrine to 
partial redemptions. 
25 Mintz & Plumb, Step Transactions in Corporate Reorganizations, 12 N.Y.U. 
INST. ON FED. TAX'N 247 (1954). 
2s E.g., Commissioner v. Gordon, 391 U.S. 83 (1968); American Bantam Car 
Co. v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 397 (1948), afj'd per curiam 177 F.2d 513 (3d 
Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 920 (1950). 
27 E.g., King Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511 (Ct. CJ. 1969) 
(transfer of stock in target for cash and stock of acquiring corporation followed 
by merger of target into its new parent; held, steps collapsed and initial exchange 
treated as part of reorganization although old stockholders of target did not par-
ticipate in merger and may not have been aware that it occurred). 
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the step transaction doctrine is almost uniformly applied.28 When these 
tests are met, the discrete steps taken by the parties are in fact compo-
nents of a single, continuing transaction. Thus, it is not only appropriate 
but logically necessary to integrate those steps and to analyze their in-
come tax consequences in that light. The facts of Zenz v. Quinlivan 
itself, and of most cases in which the parties have sought the same result, 
clearly meet this standard for integration. 
The second question is whether the change in stock ownership pro-
duced by the sale affects the characterization of the redemption. It does 
not necessarily follow from the decision to integrate that the sales com-
ponent of the transaction is relevant to the characterization of the re-
demption. 29 The relevance of one step in a transaction to another is a 
question of law which, in this context, must be resolved by reference to 
the policy embodied in the substantially disproportionate test of section 
302(b) (2), a mechanical test designed to evaluate the extent to which 
a redemption resembles a sale of stock to a new investor. The plain 
focus of the substantially disproportionate test is upon the reduction in 
the redeemed shareholder's ownership, not upon whatever correlative 
increase in interest may be obtained by others. It is not material whether 
the increase in ownership is obtained by one who previously owned stock 
in the corporation (as in a simple redemption) or by a new investor (as 
in a redemption coupled with a sale). An ownership shift produced by 
contemporaneous sales of stock thus has the same relevance to the char-
acterization of the redemption as the shift resulting from the redemption 
alone. Accordingly, the Zenz integration doctrine is the correct method 
of analyzing redemptions that are factually integrated with sales. 
A crucial distinction that will shortly be developed must, however, be 
observed. While all of the redeemed stockholder's transfers are relevant 
to the computation of the change in proportionate interest, not all 
28 For a typical example, see West Coast Marketing Corp. v. Commissioner, 
46 T.C. 32 (1966). See generally BITIKER & EusTICE, supra note 13, at~ 14.51. 
29 For example, a B reorganization is an acquisition of stock in the target cor-
poration in exchange solely for voting stock of the acquiring corporation. If, 
incident to such a reorganization, debt of the target is acquired for debt of the 
acquiring corporation, the debt for debt exchange does not destroy the reorgani-
zation merely because the exchange goes beyond the transaction described in 
§ 368(a)(1)(B). Rather, the exchange is irrelevant to the reorganization and 
therefore is taxed separately. Rev. Rul. 69-142, 1969-1 C.B, 107. C/. Rev. Rul. 
70-269, 1970-1 C.B. 82 (stock options). 
This distinction between relevance and factual integration has recently been 
developed in Chirelstein & Lopata, Recent Developments in the Step-Transaction 
Doctrine, 60 TAXES 970 (1982). The authors observe that in step transaction 
litigation, the results reached are determined both· by factual integration and by 
"policy and Code structure." That is, the issue depends on whether the integrated 
step is relevant to the policy of the substantive Code provision in question. 
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changes in proportionate interest are relevant to the characterization of 
a corporate distribution. This limitation of the legitimate scope of the 
Zenz doctrine does not appear to have been observed when the doctrine 
was extended to substantially disproportionate redemptions. 
While the Zenz integration doctrine rapidly became established in the 
jurisprudence of section 302(b)(3), it remained unclear for over 20 
years whether or to what extent sales would be integrated with redemp-
tions under section 302(b) (2) if a redeemed stockholder retained an 
interest in the corporation.30 The logic of the doctrine applies to this 
case, however, and it was so applied in Revenue Ruling 75-447.31 Zenz 
was there characterized as holding that if a sale and redemption occur as 
parts of a single transaction, both steps must be integrated for the pur-
pose of testing for dividend equivalence. The order of events, the ruling 
says, is irrelevant. Thus, the ruling concludes, for the purposes of the 
substantially disproportionate test of section 302(b)(2), the stock-
holders' interests in the corporation prior to the redemption or sale are 
to be compared with their holdings following both steps in the trans-
action. 
The ruling gives an example: A corporation having 100 shares of 
stock outstanding was owned by two equal stockholders. Each stock-
holder sold 15 of his 50 shares to a new investor and caused the corpo-
ration to redeem five of his shares. The ruling held that the change in 
proportionate interest of each of the old stockholders was to be measured 
by comparing his initial holding of 50/100 with his ultimate holding of 
30/90. Since 33 percent is less than 80 percent of 50 percent, the safe 
harbor test of section 302(b) (2) is satisfied and both of the old stock-
holders are entitled to capital gains taxation with respect to both the sale 
and the redemption. 
The ruling also addressed another variation that had not previously 
been the subject of either a ruling or court decision. The desired shift in 
corporate ownership could be accomplished without any direct sales of 
stock at the shareholder level. Instead, the old and the new stockholder 
groups might deal exclusively with the corporation, the old stockholders 
having a greater amount of their stock redeemed and the new investor 
acquiring stock by an original issue from the corporation. In the ex-
ample in the ruling, each of the old stockholders could have caused the 
corporation to redeem 20 shares of his stock, and the new investor could 
have purchased 30 shares from the corporation. The ruling treated these 
alternative forms of accomplishing a shift of investment identically. 
Under the again expanded Zenz doctrine, therefore, a redemption is in-
3° See Friend v. United States, 345 F.2d 761 (1st Cir. 1965). 
31 1975-2 C.B. 113. 
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tegrated with a sale of stock at the corporate level, and the change in 
proportionate ownership is measured on the completion of both steps in 
the transaction. 
The extension of the Zenz doctrine to the integration of corporate 
level sales is also correct. The corporate sale variation is merely an in-
direct method of achieving precisely the same result as previously was 
obtained by a direct stockholder sale. Since the two variants are func-
tional equivalents, they should bear the same income tax burden. That 
the new and old groups do not deal directly with each other is irrelevant. 
If the corporate sale were not integrated with the redemption, the old 
stockholders would be regarded as not reducing their interests at all-a 
plainly unrealistic conclusion. Indeed, the redemption of 40 shares of 
stock is somewhat illusory since the new investor, by prearrangement, 
replenishes the value of the corporation to the extent of his new invest-
ment. If, for analytical purposes, this transitory flow of value were 
washed out, the transaction might be reconstructed as a redemption of 
ten shares of stock from the old stockholders and a direct sale of 30 
shares from them to the new investor-the very transaction considered 
first. 32 Thus, Revenue Ruling 75-447 is correct in concluding that to 
the extent fresh investment constitutes the functional equivalent of a 
direct stockholder sale of stock, the change in proportionate ownership 
it produces is entirely relevant to the characterization of the accompany-
ing redemption. 
The integration of corporate sales with redemptions, however, creates 
a factual possibility that is not present when the sales are made by stock-
holders. When stock sales are made by a corporation rather than its old 
stockholders, more shares can be issued than are redeemed and the cor-
porate entity may expand rather than contract as a result of the combined 
transactions. The new investor, for example, might wish to acquire, not 
33 percent of the corporation, but 50 percent and accordingly might in-
vest a greater amount in exchange for 60 shares of stock. After the re-
demption of 40 shares from the two old stockholders, the corporation 
would have 120 shares outstanding. 33 Such an expansion could not occur 
32 It is not suggested here that redemptions and corporate sales should generally 
be reconstructed as shareholder level sales. Rather, the suggestion is merely that 
since the resulting proportionate change in ownership is identical regardless of 
which format is employed, the characterizations of the distributions should also 
be identical. On appropriate facts, however, such a reconstruction would be war-
ranted. See, e.g., Wall v. United States, 164 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1947). See also 
Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Commissioner, 430 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. 
denied, 401 U.S. 939 ( 1971). 
33 For the sake of simplicity, in this and subsequent illustrations it is assumed 
that the value of a share of stock in the corporation remains unchanged and, when 
two corporations are involved, and that their shares are of equal value. A contrary 
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review 
1983] FRESH INVESTMENT 433 
if only stock previously outstanding in the hands of the old stockholders 
had been sold. 
If Revenue Ruling 75-447 were applied literally to a redemption ac-
companied by such a corporate sale, a plainly erroneous result would 
obtain. In the example, each of the old stockholders would be regarded 
as having reduced his proportionate interest in the corporation from 
50/100 or 50 percent to 30/120 or 25 percent, a reduction of 50 per-
cent, when in fact he liquidated only 40 percent of his prior investment, 
20 shares out of 50. Effect would be given not only to new investment 
that replaced the value distributed in the redemption but also to the fur-
ther fresh investment that expanded the size of the corporation. Yet, to 
the extent of this expansion, the resulting shift in proportionate owner-
ship does not reflect a disposition and thus should not be relevant to the 
characterization of the redemption. 
While it is unquestionably correct as a factual matter to integrate re-
demptions with sales, whether by the redeemed stockholder or by the 
corporation, a blind application of the Zenz integration doctrine and the 
mechanical formula of section 302(b)(2) cannot be permitted to ob-
scure the central issue that these rules address. Section 302(b) is de-
signed to measure the extent to which a liquidation of investment by 
means of a redemption resembles a sale. In testing for that similarity, 
the formula contained in section 302(b) (2) refers to the stockholder's 
proportionate interest immediately after the redemption because, in the 
simple redemption the formula was designed to address, that resulting 
proportionate interest accurately reflects the extent to which the redemp-
tion shifted ownership of the corporation to another. The shareholder's 
resulting proportionate interest is the appropriate measure of the change 
in proportionate interest in the case of a simple redemption, not accom-
panied by any fresh investment, because that resulting interest is solely 
produced by the redemption. 
Section 302 was not drafted, however, to measure sale resemblance in 
a transaction accompanied by fresh investment. In extending the scope 
of section 302 to encompass such a shift in investment, the formula of 
section 302(b) (2) must be applied consistently with its purpose of mea-
suring the degree of similarity between the transaction in question and 
a sale. If a redemption is accompanied by fresh investment made di-
rectly in the corporation, but a corporate contraction nevertheless results 
because the redemption distribution exceeds the new investment, the net 
effect of the transaction is identical to a sale of stock directly from the 
old stockholder to the new investor accompanied by a redemption. Both 
assumption would affect only the complexity of the illustration, not the principle 
illustrated. 
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the redemption and the constructive sale reduce the shareholder's invest-
ment. The stockholder's final proportionate interest is solely a product 
of his dispositions, as in a simple redemption, and thus can properly be 
used in determining whether the change in proportionate interest by 
virtue of the aggregate of these dispositions is sufficient to cause the re-
demption to be treated as a sale. 
On the other hand, the mere receipt by a corporation of fresh invest-
ment, not accompanied by a redemption, is not a disposition by the exist-
ing shareholders. The existing shareholders have not thereby reduced 
their investments and indeed under our system of taxation have not par-
ticipated in a transaction regarded as a taxable event. 34 The decline in 
the proportionate interests of the existing shareholders caused solely by 
such a fresh investment does not at all resemble a sale of stock at the 
shareholder level, and is of a very different character than the declines 
in interest that section 302(b) (2) was designed to measure. 
If a redemption is accompanied by fresh investment which results in 
an expansion of the corporate entity, the effect of the combined trans-
action is the same as a sale of stock at the shareholder level plus a fur-
ther fresh investment. To the extent that the fresh investment does not 
exceed the redemption distribution, the investment reflects a disposition 
of stock by the existing shareholder and is relevant to the characterization 
of redemption. On the other hand, to the extent that the fresh investment 
exceeds the redemption distribution, it does not reflect a disposition by 
the existing shareholder and is entirely irrelevant to the characterization 
of the contemporaneous redemption. Since the reduction in proportion-
ate ownership produced by a corporate expansion is not relevant to the 
comparison section 302(b) (2) was designed to make, the change in pro-
portionate ownership attributable to the expansion must be excluded from 
the computation. 
It follows that in computing the interests of the redeemed stockholders 
after the transaction, the continuing stock interest must be measured with 
respect to an amount no greater than the value of their old investment. 
If the value of each share is not independently altered in the transaction, 
the denominator of the "after" fraction used under section 302 (b) ( 2) 
34 The law could be otherwise. Fresh investment in a corporation could be 
reconstructed as a sale by each of the old stockholders of a portion of his stock 
to the new investor followed by a contribution of the proceeds of the sale to the 
corporation. Such a characterization would merely accelerate the tax on the old 
stockholders' unrealized appreciation. The acceleration does not seem justified, 
however, since no value has been removed from corporate solution. The only 
effect of the transaction upon the old stockholders is that their stock in the cor-
poration now represents an interest in an altered mix of assets-a circumstance 
that could result from corporate action not involving new investment which would 
clearly not amount to a disposition by the old stockholders. 
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cannot exceed the number of shares outstanding before the transaction. 
In the example, notwithstanding that the new investment increased the 
total shares outstanding from 100 before to 120 after the transaction, the 
continUing interest of each of the old stockholders in his prior investment 
is 30/100, not 30/120. Accordingly, the proportionate interests of each 
of the old stockholders should be regarded as declining from 50/100, or 
50 percent, to 30/100, or 30 percent. So treating the old stockholders as 
disposing of 40 percent of their investments accurately reflects the extent 
to which they have transferred an interest in their old investments to the 
new investors by the redemption and corporate sale of stock. The addi-
tional investment by the new investor in exchange for 20 shares of stock 
is simply irrelevant to this measurement. Neither is it relevant that the 
retained 60 percent of the old investment is now represented by a 50 
percent interest in a somewhat expanded corporation. If the old stock-
holders were treated as retaining 30/120, or 25 percent, of their invest-
ment, they would be regarded as having disposed of 50 percent of their 
investment, which they did not do. Taking the fresh investment into 
account would overstate the extent of the reduction in interest and erro-
neously extend sales treatment to distributions that did not entail a suffi-
ciently material shift in interest to be entitled to such treatment. 
Moreover, whether a redemption has produced a sufficiently material 
shift in the ownership of the corporation to be entitled to sales treatment 
should not be affected by the extent to which the value of the corpora-
tion expands by virtue of fresh investment. Since that investment is 
irrelevant to the characterization of the redemption, its effect should be 
neutral. If one of the old stockholders causes 10 of his 50 shares to be 
redeemed, for example, the redemption should be regarded as reducing 
his continuing interest in the corporation by no more than 20 percent, 
an amount insufficient to meet the substantially disproportionate text, re-
gardless of the number of shares of stock of the corporation outstanding 
after the transaction. Exactly that neutrality would be achieved by modi-
fying Revenue Ruling 75-447 to address only the continued proportion-
ate interest in the prior investment. Under a literal application of the 
ruling, the decline in interest would be a function of the level of new 
investment and could produce a computed decline vastly in excess of 20 
percent. If the fresh investment caused the number of outstanding shares 
to increase to 1,000, for example, the redeeming stockholder would be 
regarded as reducing his investment to 40/1000 or four percent, are-
duction of 92 percent and a totally unrealistic result. Indeed, if full 
effect were given to fresh investment, it would produce the absurd result 
of converting the most trivial, pro rata redemption of stock from the old 
stockholders into a disposition entitled to sales treatment if the redemp-
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tion were accompanied by a significant offering of stock by the corpora-
tion.35 It seems most unlikely that such a moratorium on the general 
rule of section 302 was intended by Congress, the court in Zenz v. Quin-
livan, or by the draftsmen of Revenue Ruling 75-447. 
Most Zenz transactions do not result in corporate expansions. Quite 
the contrary, a common objective in combining sales and redemptions is 
the reduction in the value of the corporation to enable employees or 
children to acquire greater interests than would otherwise be possible. In 
addition, these transactions are commonly used to withdraw unneeded 
liquid assets from corporate solution at capital gains tax rates. Although 
the Commissioner has issued several private rulings applying Revenue 
Ruling 75-447 favorably to taxpayers, none has been discovered in which 
the value of the corporation increased in the transaction.36 
It is probable that in issuing Revenue Ruling 75-447, the Commis-
sioner did not appreciate this difference between stockholder level and 
corporate level sales of stock or the implications of fully integrating the 
latter under the Zenz doctrine. The possibility of a corporate expansion 
was not mentioned in the ruling. Accordingly, it seems that the mora-
torium on dividend treatment that the ruling appears to sanction was 
inadvertent and not intended by the Commissioner. The ruling should 
not be applied literally in the event of a corporate expansion and should 
be modified to remove any contrary implication. 
The observations thus far with respect to the relevance of fresh invest-
ment to the characterization of redemption distributions can be sum-
marized as follows: It is proper, actually logically unavoidable, to in-
tegrate redemptions with new investment, whether the new investment 
occurs by way of a direct sale of stock by a shareholder or a corporate 
sale. Notwithstanding that integration, fresh investment, to the extent 
that it increases the value of the corporation, is irrelevant to the char-
acterization of the redemption. Accordingly, in measuring the amount 
of stock outstanding after the transaction, the amount taken into account 
should not exceed the lesser of the actual amount outstanding or the 
amount outstanding prior to the transaction. 
3:> This consequence of Revenue Ruling 75-447 was noted by the American 
Law Institute, seemingly with disapproval. ALI, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT 
106 (Tent. Draft No.2, 1979) (Subchapter C, Corporate Distributions). 
36 For shareholder sales, see, e.g., LTR 8217138 (Jan. 28, 1982); LTR 8113098 
(Dec. 31, 1980); and LTR 8030120 (May 1, 1980). For corporate sales, see 
LTR 8130066 (April29, 1981). For gifts integrated with a redemption, see LTR 
8012085 (Dec. 28, 1979). See also LTR 8040114 (July 15, 1980) (integration 
used to sustain sales treatment under section 302(b)(l) when substantially dis-
proportionate test not met). 
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If a corporation obtains fresh investment from another corporation 
and the transaction takes the form of a merger or consolidation of the 
two corporations,37 the old stockholders of the former emerge from the 
transaction, as in the transactions considered before, with a continuing 
interest in their previously owned assets which are now commingled with 
the fresh investment, the assets of the acquiring corporation. Also as 
before, the old stockholders may choose the occasion of the merger or 
consolidation to reduce their investments by obtaining distributions of 
cash or property other than stock or securities in the resulting corpora-
tion. If such a distribution of cash or property-"boot" in the parlance 
of the tax specialist-occurs, it must be characterized as either the equiv-
alent of a dividend or as a disposition entitling the stockholder to sales 
treatment. As in the case of the Zenz redemption, the crucial questions 
are whether and to what extent the reduction of the old stockholders' 
interests by virtue of the fresh investment affects the characterization of 
the distribution. 
Concededly, the nature of the broader transaction in which the fresh 
investment is obtained is quite different in a reorganization from the 
transactions previously considered. As a result, the consequences to the 
other parties to the transaction and, indeed, to a withdrawing share-
holder to the extent of his remaining investment, are quite different. 
Nevertheless, the boot and redemption distributions are identical in their 
effects on the old stockholder: In both cases, a partial disinvestment 
accompanies a retained interest in an altered mLx of assets. It would 
therefore be desirable for the analysis of the characterization of the boot 
distribution to proceed along the same lines as the analysis of the partial 
Zenz redemption. That result, however, has not been achieved. 
Unfortunately, the legal issue begins somewhat differently. If the 
stockholders in question were stockholders in the target corporation 
which disappeared in the merger, the characterization of the distribution 
to them is governed not by section 302 but by section 356(a) (2). The 
latter provision lacks the safe harbor rules of section 302 and merely 
provides that the distribution is taxed as a dividend if it has the effect of 
a dividend. 
Until relatively recently, the Commissioner generally argued that any 
boot distribution in a reorganization had the effect of a dividend to the 
37 Of the three forms of acquisitive reorganizations authorized by § 368(a) (1), 
only the A reorganization, a statutory merger or consolidation, liberally permits the 
use of boot. Accordingly, the discussion in the text is limited to reorganizations 
qualifying under§ 368(a)(l)(A). 
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extent of the earnings and profits of the acquired corporation. 38 While 
this so-called automatic dividend rule was applied, the question of inte-
gration was simply irrelevant. However, the authority of the automatic 
dividend position weakened by the early 1970's, and the attention of the 
courts and the Commissioner then turned to the development of more 
discriminating tests for dividend equivalence. 30 The obvious analogy 
was the rules that had evolved under section 302, and when the Com-
missioner confirmed the demise of the automatic approach, he agreed 
that the tests of that section, including the substantially disproportionate 
rule of section 302(b)(2), might serve as guidelines in the application 
of the boot characterization rule of section 356(a) (2).40 While the 
Commissioner did not say so at the time, the tests of section 302 so 
adopted did not include the Zenz integration doctrine. 
The JRelevance of Fresh Investmen~ 
In contrast to the usual Zenz-type redemption, a merger or other re-
organization almost always results in an expansion of the resulting corpo-
rate entity. Thus the application of the Zenz integration doctrine along 
the lines indicated in Revenue Ruling 7 5-44 7 would, in nearly every 
case, produce the inappropriate results described above. 
Indeed, the Commissioner was already painfully aware of the dangers 
of an integrated transaction approach to the characterization of boot. 
In McDonald v. Commissioner, 41 the taxpayer, as part of a plan for the 
acquisition of a corporation in which he was the majority stockholder, 
caused the corporation to redeem a portion of his stock for cash. Imme-
38 This automatic dividend rule is generally attributed to the opinion in Com-
missioner v. Estate of Bedford, 325 U.S. 283 (1945). See Shoulson, Boot Taxa-
tion: The Blunt Toe of the Automatic Rule, 20 TAX L. REv. 573 ( 1965); Darrell, 
The Scope of Commissioner v . .Bedford's Estate, 24 TAXES 266 (1946). 
30 See Gerson, Boot Dividends and the Automatic Rule: Bedford Revisited, 
11 WM. & MARY L. REV. 841 (1970). The automatic rule was first undermined 
in a case in which the Commissioner, seeking to resist dividend treatment, argued 
that the court should not automatically characterize boot as a dividend. Idaho 
Power Co. v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 807 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 
832 (1958). The cases decided during the 15 years following Idaho Power 
analyzed boot in a manner resembling the inquiry under § 302, but apparently 
no consideration was given to the change in ownership produced by the reorgani-
zation itself. See, e.g., King Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511 
(Ct. Cl. 1969). 
40 Rev. Rul. 74-515, 1974-2 C.B. 118; Rev. Rul. 74-516, 1974-2 C.B. 121. 
Collectively, these rulings indicated that the Service would apply the meaningful 
reduction test developed in Davis v. United States, 397 U.S. 301 ( 1970), under 
the dividend equivalence rule of § 302{b){l). In addition, Revenue Ruling 
74-516 computed the reduction in interest using the substantially disproportionate 
formula of§ 302(b)(2). 
4152 T.C. 82 (1969). 
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diately thereafter, the taxpayer transferred all of his remaining interest 
in the corporation to the acquiring corporation in a transaction that all 
parties conceded was a valid reorganization within the definition of sec-
tion 368(a) (1) (B).42 Since a B reorganization cannot be accompanied 
by a boot distribution, the Tax Court was forced to treat the distribution 
as a redemption controlled by section 302 and Zenz rather than as boot 
governed by section 356. In applying these tests to the redemption, the 
court integrated the redemption and the reorganization and thus viewed 
the interest of the taxpayer as declining from over 90 percent before the 
transaction to an insignificant percentage of the stock of the acquiring 
corporation after the transaction. Were a similar analysis to be applied 
to the characterization of boot under section 356, virtually all boot dis-
tributions would be regarded as not having the effect of a dividend. 
Since the Zenz integration rule appeared to produce the wrong result, 
the Commissioner opted for its opposite in Revenue Ruling 75-83."3 
Without reference to either Zenz v. Quinlivan or McDonald v. Commis-
sioner, the ruling concluded that boot received by a stockholder of a 
target corporation would be treated as if it were distributed in a trans-
action separate from the reorganization occurring prior to the reorgani-
zation.H As a result, a pro rata distribution of boot would not be re-
garded as diminishing the continuing interest of the old stockholders to 
any degree and thus would always be treated as having the effect of a 
dividend. 
Revenue Ruling 75-83 thus began the cycle anew for its analysis is 
identical to the litigating position asserted by the government in Zenz v. 
Quinlivan over twenty years before. There too, the government con-
tended that the corporate distribution and the new investment should 
be treated separately and as if the redemption had occurred first. As in 
the context of a Zenz redemption, treating the distribution of boot as 
separate from the blending of investment that occurs in the merger itself 
is absolutely untenable. 45 Indeed, if different at all, a boot distribution 
4 2 In Revenue Ruling 75-360, 1975-2 C.B. 110, the Commissioner withdrew 
that concession. Asserting that the Tax Court was correct in viewing the redemp-
tion and the later reorganization as a single transaction, the ruling characterized the 
purported redemption as a boot distribution. Since boot is not permitted in a B 
reorganization, the ruling concluded that the transaction was not a tax-free re-
organization. 
43 1975-1 C.B. 112. 
44 Although Revenue Ruling 75-83 clearly adopts a separate and before analysis, 
it states no reasons for that conclusion and in fact does not even acknowledge 
that the conclusion requires the application of a separate transaction analysis. 
45 The separate transaction analysis of boot in a reorganization is also incon-
sistent with the analysis of the reorganization itself that is employed by the Com-
missioner. A nonstatutory prerequisite for reorganization treatment is that the 
stockholders of the target corporation maintain a continuity of interest in the 
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is usually more firmly prearranged and more clearly integral to a reorga-
nization than is a redemption which may merely set the stage for a sale 
of stock. The reduction in proportionate interest suffered by the stock-
holders of the target corporation as a result of their receipt of boot and 
the reduction attributable to the new investment obtained in the merger 
are clearly integrated steps in a single transaction and cannot properly 
be analyzed otherwise. 
Not only are boot distributions and Zenz redemptions both steps in 
integrated transactions, but their characterization also presents the same 
ultimate issue. Either corporate distribution is entitled to sales rather 
than dividend treatment if its effect is to shift materially the ownership 
of the corporation to other stockholders. That much the Service seems to 
have conceded when it acknowledged that the principles of section 302 
were applicable to boot characterization issues arising under section 356. 
In analyzing the Zenz redemption, it was observed that a reduction in 
corporate ownership resulting from a shift to new investors who had dealt 
solely with the corporation was entirely relevant to the characterization 
of corporate distributions. The character of that reduction is unaffected 
by whether the new investment is attributable to the purchase of stock 
from the corporation or a corporate combination. In either case, the old 
stockholders' proportionate interests in the continuing corporate entity 
have been reduced to the same extent. Thus, the reduction in propor-
tionate interest caused by the merger is as relevant to the characteriza-
tion of boot distributed in the merger as is the reduction in interest pro-
duced by new investment in a Zenz redemption. 
However, an integrated transaction analysis of boot need not lead, as 
the Commissioner undoubtedly feared, to the unsatisfactory result 
reached in McDonald v. Commissioner. As in the event of a Zenz re-
demption, the measurement of a shift in proportionate interest is not 
simply a matter of comparing a stockholder's former holdings with the 
interest obtained in an altered and greatly expanded corporation. Rather, 
resulting corporation. See infra the discussion in the text accompanying notes 
91-93. For the purpose of measuring this continuity, it is the established position 
of the Service that redemptions incident to the reorganization are to be taken into 
account, that is, integrated with the reorganization itself. Rev. Proc. 77-37, § 3.02, 
1977-2 C.B. 568, superseded in part, Rev. Proc. 79-14, 1979-1 C.B. 496, super-
seded, Rev. Proc. 80-22, 1980-1 C.B. 654, superseded, Rev. Proc. 81-10, 1981-1 
C.B. 647, superseded, Rev. Proc. 82-22, 1982-1 C.B. 469, modified and super-
seded, Rev. Proc. 82-60, 1982-45 I.R.B. 29 (Nov. 8). Similarly, in Revenue Rul-
ing 75-360, 1975-2 C.B. 110, the Commissioner contended that a redemption 
should be integrated with a stock exchange for the purpose of determining whether 
a qualifying reorganization had occurred. The Commissioner under present policy 
thus is in the absurd position of arguing that the boot must be integrated for the 
purpose of testing for a reorganization but separated for the purpose of deter-
mining the character of the boot. 
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the relevant factor is the extent to which the stockholder has disposed 
of the old investment in a manner that accomplishes a shift of ownership. 
The reduction in proportionate ownership attributable to the corporate 
expansion is irrelevant to this question for the reasons stated in connec-
tion with the Zenz redemption: To this extent, the reduction in propor-
tionate interest does not reflect a disposition. The calculation of the 
extent to which recipients of boot have diminished their continuing pro-
portionate interest in their old investment should only be made with 
reference to the original value of that investment. Thus, after the trans-
action, a stockholder must be regarded as owning that proportion of his 
prior investment that the value of his post-reorganization holding bears 
to the value of his interest in the old corporation prior to the reorganiza-
tion. Any further reduction in proportionate interest occasioned by the 
merger is irrelevant to the chJtracterization of the boot. 
The differences between these approaches can be illustrated using the 
facts assumed in Revenue Ruling 75.,...83: Corporation X, the 60 out-
standing shares of which were owned by individual A, is acquired in a 
statutory merger by corporation Y, the 40 outstanding shares of which 
were equally owned by individuals B, C, D, and E. (It is assumed the 
value of an X share equals the value of a Y share.) In the merger, A 
receives 35 shares of Y stock plus boot of $250x. Under its separate 
transaction approach, the Service treated A's interest as merely changing 
from 60/60 to 35/35 for no reduction in proportionate interest at all, 
notwithstanding that A withdraws a substantial portion of his investment 
from corporate solution and owns only 35 of the 75 shares of Y stock 
outstanding after the reorganization. Under the court's analysis in Mc-
Donald v. Commissioner, A's interest would be regarded as declining 
from 60/60 or 100 percent to 35/75 or 47 percent, the same result as 
would be reached under a literal application of Revenue Ruling 75-447 
in an analogous Zenz redemption. Under the approach suggested here, 
A's interest would be regarded as falling from 60/60 to 35/60 or 58 per-
cent, a computed reduction that accurately reflects the extent of A's dis-
position of his prior interest to B, C, D, and E. Quite plainly, the addi-
tional investment of the owners of the acquiring corporation should have 
no effect on the character of A's disinvestment. Conversely, the shift in 
ownership actually produced by A's disinvestment cannot properly be 
ignored as the Commissioner has proposed. 
The Inadequacy of Current Solutions 
Before the Commissioner issued Revenue Ruling 75-83 formalizing 
the separate transaction approach to boot characterization, the Eighth 
Circuit was required to address the issue in a case that one can only wish 
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had not arisen when it did. Posing pathological facts that have unduly 
influenced subsequent authorities, Wright v. United States 46 probably 
has retarded the evolution of a proper rule for more typical cases. The 
taxpayer in Wright had owned a controlling interest in both of the corpo-
rations that were combined, F & G and World Wide. The corporations 
were consolidated into a newly formed survivor, Omni. Boot was issued 
to the taxpayer by the surviving corporation and was not allocated by 
the parties with respect to the stock of the predecessor corporations. 
Thus, the taxpayer exchanged his 99 percent interest in F & G and his 
56 percent interest in World Wide for a 62 percent interest in Omni plus 
boot in the approximate amount of $100,000. 
Consistently with his later ruling, the Commissioner argued that the 
boot should be characterized independently for each constituent corpo-
ration and without regard to the change in ownership produced in the 
reorganization-the separate transaction approach. 47 The Commissioner 
initially suggested that the boot be treated as issued entirely in redemp-
tion of stock of F & G-a redemption which, if viewed separately from 
the reorganization, would yield only a de minimis change in ownership 
and thus dividend treatment. During the argument of the case, however, 
the government acknowledged that an allocation of the boot between F 
& G and World Wide might also be appropriate.48 
The court rejected the Commissioner's separate and before analysis. 
It plainly believed that an approach that almost invariably produced 
dividend treatment to a dominant stockholder by ignoring the material 
change of ownership that occurred in the same transaction was not sen-
sible. 40 On the other hand, the Court did not embrace the integration 
approach suggested by McDonald v. Commissioner, although this aspect 
of the court's opinion has been widely misunderstood. uo Instead of 
4 6482 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1973). 
47 Id. at 606. The Commissioner also argued, and the court agreed, that the 
principles of § 302 should be applicable in characterizing the boot. Id. 
48 I d. at 605-06. If all of the boot were treated as distributed by F & G, the tax-
payer's interest would have been regarded as declining from 99.16% to 95.43%. 
40 The court rejected the separate and before approach urged by the Commis-
sioner on the ground that it was an "artificial" reading of § 302 that ignored the 
continuation of the corporate entity. I d. at 608. 
50 The court never suggested, nor apparently did the taxpayer, that the initial 
99% interest should be compared with the resulting 62% interest. However, in 
the only other modern appellate decision addressing the boot characterization 
issue, the court seemed to think that the court in Wright had used the McDonald 
approach. Shimberg v. United States, 577 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1978), criticized 
infra in text accompanying notes 63-68. See also Levin, Adess & McGaffey, Boot 
Distributions in Corporate Reorganizations-Determination of Dividend Equiva-
lency, 30 Tax Law. 287 (1977). The authors approve of the Wright decision and 
clearly understand its holding but also appear to approve of the decision in 
McDonald and to regard that case as a precedent for the decision in Wright. 
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adopting either extreme method of characterization, the court developed 
a compromise approach, the form of which was quite likely influenced 
by the unusual facts before it. It held that the boot should be regarded 
as distributed by Omni, the surviving corporation, in exchange for the 
stock in Omni that would have been issued had there been no boot at all. 
Thus, the court compared the combined ownership interest of the tax-
payer in the constituent corporations with his ownership interest in the 
same assets after the transaction.111 
Several aspects to the compromise solution suggested in Wright must 
be examined separately. Arguably, the special problem of overlapping 
ownership, considered below, was the only issue addressed in Wright, 
for there is nothing in the opinion to suggest that the court was purport-
ing to espouse a principle of boot characterization that would apply in 
the absence of the special facts of that case. Nevertheless, both the Com-
missioner and later cases involving boot characterization have speculated 
on how the rule of that case might be applied in the absence of overlap-
ping ownership. 
Applying the Wright principle to the example used above, A's interest 
is regarded as declining from the interest he would have received if no 
boot had been issued, 60/100, with his actual resulting interest, 35/75. 
The substantially disproportionate test of section 302(b) (2) is met be-
cause A's retained interest of 35/75 or 47 percent is 78 percent of his 
prior interest of 60 percent. Thus, relative to the approach suggested 
here, the Wright formula significantly understates the extent to which 
A's interest has been reduced and therefore is more likely to produce 
dividend treatment. 52 
51 In the district court the taxpayer had made the rather curious argument that 
the transfer of the stock of F & G and World Wide to Omni and the dissolution 
of the constituent corporations were separate transactions and that accordingly 
the taxpayer's exchange of stock was free of tax under § 351, rather than the 
reorganization provisions. Had that been the case, the boot would have been taxed 
at capital gains rates since that section lacks a dividend equivalence provision. 
Somewhat ironically, in view of his position on the characterization issue, the 
Commissioner prevailed on this point by demonstrating that the formation of 
Omoi and the dissolution of the constituent corporations were steps in an inte-
grated transaction. 72-2 U.S.T.C. (CCH) ~ 9495 (E.D. Ark. May 24, 1972). 
52 The suggested approach, in contrast, makes it more likely that a redemption 
will meet the additional requirement of the substantially disproportionate test that 
the redemption leave the redeemed stockholder with less than 50 percent of the 
corporation's voting stock. I.R.C. § 302(b) (2) (B). This limitation is presumably 
applied when the rules of § 302(b) are borrowed for use under § 356. The before 
and after percentages are both lower under the Wright approach than under the 
approach advocated here. (In the example, they are 60 and 47 percent under 
Wright and 100 and 58 percent under the advocated approach.) The 50 percent 
limitation is thus more likely to be met if the Wright approach is used. The de-
cline in proportionate interest is greater under the advocated approach, in coo-
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The reason for this difference is that like Revenue Ruling 75-83, the 
Wright formula is a separate rather than an integrated transaction ap-
proach. Rather than treating the boot distribution as occurring prior to 
the merger, as would Revenue Ruling 75-83, the Wright court viewed 
the distribution as occurring after the merger. Both approaches give 
effect to the change in ownership attributable to the boot distribution 
but not to the change in ownership produced by the merger. By treating 
A's former interest as 60/100, the proportionate interest already diluted 
by the merger, the Wright approach eliminates that reduction in interest 
from the section 302(b)(2) computation. Accordingly, the Wright ap-
proach is objectionable for precisely the same reason as is the separate 
transaction approach of the Service which the court in Wright rejected.G3 
Although the Service has rejected the Wright approach in favor of its 
harsher separate and before analysis, Wright emerges as more favorable 
to a finding of dividend equivalence than the integrated approach en-
dorsed by the Service in the analogous redemption context. Given the 
weakness of the Service's own separate transaction analysis, it may seem 
surprising that the Commissioner did not immediately embrace the rea-
soning of the Wright court. One explanation for this resistence may be 
that the Commissioner, with one fearful eye fixed on McDonald v. Com-
missioner, never understood Wright. Revenue Ruling 75-83, the Com-
missioner's response to the decision in Wright, initially illustrated his 
disagreement with an example in which there was overlapping owner-
ship.54 When reprinted in the Cumulative Bulletin, however, the ex-
ample had been changed to assume a merger which lacked any overlap-
trast, and the stockholder is thus more likely under this approach to meet the 
other requirement of the substantiaily disproportionate test-that his propor-
tionate interest after the transaction be less than 80 percent of what it was before. 
I.R.C. § 302(b) (2) (C). 
53 Although mergers do not normally result in corporate contractions, the error 
of the Wright analysis can be seen quite clearly by comparing that approach with 
the Zenz integration approach of Revenue Ruling 75-447. Adjusting the facts of 
that ruling to the merger context, assume a target corporation with 100 shares of 
stock outstanding and equaily owned by two stockholders is acquired by a corpo-
ration with 30 shares of stock outstanding and having the same value. In the 
merger, each stockholder in the target corporation receives 30 shares of acquiring 
corporation stock and boot of $20x. Under the approach of Revenue Ruling 
75-447, each of the target stockholders would be regarded as having reduced his 
interest from 50/100 to 30/90, thus retaining 67 percent of his investment. Under 
the Wright approach, however, each would be regarded as reducing his interest 
from 50/130 to 30/90. Under§ 302(b) (2), this reduction from a 38% interest 
to a 33% interest, a retention of 87% of the prior investment, would be insufficient 
to escape dividend equivalence under the substantially disproportionate rule, con-
trary to the holding in Revenue Ruling 75-447. 
M The original version of Revenue Ruling 75-83 is described in Levin, Adess & 
McGaffey, supra note 50, at 288 n.8. In that version, A owned all 60 shares of 
corporation X and 10 of the 40 shares of corporation Y. 
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ping ownership. In this merger, A exchanged all 60 of the outstanding 
shares of the target corporation, X, for 35 shares of the acquiring corpo-
ration, Y, a corporation in which A had previously had no interest, and 
boot of $250x. Y had 75 shares outstanding after the merger. The 
ruling purports to illustrate the effects of the Wright decision on the facts 
of the ruling, stating that under Wright A's interest would be regarded 
as reduced "from 60 shares of Y stock to 35 shares." nn However, a pro-
portionate change in interest cannot be computed unless the total shares 
of stock outstanding, the denominator of the fraction, are specified. 
Under the McDonald integration approach, A's interest would be re-
garded as declining from 60/60 to 35/75, while under the Wright post-
merger redemption approach, the interest would be regarded as declining 
from 60/100 to 35/75. On the assumed facts, either reduction satisfies 
the substantially disproportionate test of section 302{b) (2), and it thus 
is not fully clear how the Commissioner interpreted the Wright decision 
or which of the tests he was rejecting. Both interpretations, however, are 
inconsistent with the separate and before approach that the ruling clearly 
did adopt. 
Since the analysis of the court in Wright was erroneous, the reasoning 
of the Commissioner in rejecting it might seem insignificant. However, 
in an attempt to discredit Wright while bolstering its own rather weak 
position, Revenue Ruling 75-83 sets forth an argument apparently 
meant to suggest that in characterizing reorganization boot, only the 
Commissioner's "separate and before" analysis is permissible. The argu-
ment, however, proves nothing of the kind. 
The reasoning of Revenue Ruling 75-83 is not fully clear. While the 
Commissioner's separate and before test is plainly set forth, the ruling 
does not characterize its approach as a separate transaction approach 
and does not consider the alternative possibility of an integrated ap-
proach. Moreover, in the only analysis contained in the ruling, the Com-
missioner explains his disagreement with the decision in Wright solely in 
terms of the proper identification of the distributing corporation. The 
ruling contends, undoubtedly correctly, that boot must be regarded as 
distributed by the target corporation, whereas the court in Wright treated 
the distribution as made by the resulting corporation.na Thus, the ruling 
55 1975-1 C.B. at 113. 
56 The ruling states only that the court in Wright erred in distinguishing cases 
holding that "the amount of the dividend is measured by reference to the earnings 
and profits of the transferor," that is, the target corporation. Since the holding 
in Wright was that the distribution was not a dividend equivalent, there was no 
occasion for the court either to distinguish or follow cases concerning earnings 
and profits computations. However, the Commissioner's point was that the court 
erred in treating Omni, rather than F & G or World Wide, as the distributing 
corporation. 
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could be read as suggesting, not that boot lacks factual integration with 
the merger, but that the change in ownership produced by the merger is 
irrelevant to the characterization of boot. That is, it may be the position 
of the Commissioner that, even if the distribution of boot and the merger 
itself are steps in an integrated transaction, the implicit requirement of 
section 356 that the boot be treated as distributed by the target corpo-
ration also requires that the character of the boot be determined solely 
by reference to the stockholders of the target corporation. The change 
in ownership thus must be measured separately from and prior to the 
merger. However, the identity of the distributing corporation should not 
control the characterization issue. 
In a boot characterization case, two quite separate questions are pre-
sented. One involves the computation of gain and, in the event of divi-
dend equivalence, of earnings and profits, issues that depend on the 
identity of the stock with respect to which the distribution is made. The 
Commissioner's objection to Wright addresses these issues. The more 
important question in Wright and Revenue Ruling 75-83, however, is 
the manner in which the change in proportionate ownership is to be com-
puted, whether under an integrated or a separate analysis and, if sepa-
rate, whether before or after. It is not evident that the resolution of the 
first issue has any implication at all for the resolution of the second. 
Once the distributing corporation has been identified, the manner in 
which the change in ownership of that corporation is to be measured 
remains entirely open. Indeed, in the Zenz context, the identity of the 
distributing corporation is clear but that identity does not bar taking into 
account the change in ownership produced by the new investment. 
If the reasoning of Revenue Ruling 75-83 has any relevance to the 
characterization issue, it is limited to a rejection of the exclusive focus 
in Wright on postreorganization holdings. There may be a conceptual 
tension between the use of the tax attributes of the target corporations 
for measuring gain while the distribution is characterized by reference 
to the holdings in the resulting corporation. 57 However, the reasoning 
As discussed below in the context of overlapping ownership, the Commissioner's 
position here is well founded. See infra notes 70-74 and accompanying text. At 
least in the absence of the peculiar facts presented in Wright, the tax consequences 
to stockholders liquidating a portion of their investment in the course of a re-
organization should be determined solely by reference to the tax attributes of the 
investment being liquidated. 
57 While a tension may be conceded, it would not have been internally incon-
sistent for the court in Wright to resolve the characterization issue as it did, by 
treating the distribution as made by the resulting corporation, but to measure the 
taxpayer's gain by reference to the tax basis of his stock in the constituent corpo-
rations. Since the entire amount of the boot would have been subject to tax re-
gardless of the identity of the distributing corporation, this issue was not material 
to the court's decision. 
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has no relevance to the choice between a separate and an integrated trans-
action approach. Under the integrated approach, it can readily be ac-
knowledged that the target corporation is the distributor of the boot, but 
the ownership dilution produced by the merger still must be taken into 
account in testing for dividend equivalence. Indeed, in McDonald, the 
court and both parties assumed that the tax attributes of the target cor-
poration rather than those of the acquiring corporation were controlling, 
even though the transactions were integrated for characterization pur-
poses.58 Accordingly, while the reasoning contained in Revenue Ruling 
75-83 may somewhat discredit the particular test employed in Wright, 
it does not support the approach adopted by the Commissioner, nor does 
it constitute an objection to an integrated approach either of the Mc-
Donald type or of the type suggested here. 
Since the publication of Revenue Ruling 75-83, only the Fifth Circuit 
has addressed the boot characterization issue. In view of the weakness 
of the Commissioner's position, it was somewhat surprising that the court 
in Shimberg v. United States 59 elected to adopt the same result. How-
ever, that court completely misunderstood the legal rules it was asked to 
apply, and its decision cannot be regarded as rational support for Reve-
nue Ruling 75-83.00 
Shimberg presented the boot characterization question in the tradi-
tional context. A relatively small corporation in which the taxpayer 
owned 66 percent of the stock was merged into a far larger company in 
a transaction which qualified as an A reorganization. The consideration 
received consisted of common stock of the acquiring corporation and 
substantial cash boot. The district court 01 correctly undertook to char-
acterize the boot under section 356(a) (2) by applying the principles of 
section 302 as construed in United States v. Davis. In testing for the 
required "meaningful reduction" of proportionate interest, the court em-
58 52 T.C. at 86. Although in McDonald the distribution was treated ns a re-
demption rather than as a boot distribution, there was no suggestion that the 
redemption should be treated as made by the acquiring corporation rather than 
the target corporation. 
59 577 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1978). 
60 In a subsequent Fifth Circuit decision in which the characterization of the 
boot did not affect the amount of tax due, the court commented favorably on the 
Shimberg opinion. General Housewares Corp. v. United States, 615 F.2d 1056 
(5th Cir. 1980). The principal issue posed by General Housewares was the fas-
cinating but quite complex question of whether a transaction may be both a 
reorganization and a liquidation. In holding that the transaction before it could 
be both, the court relied heavily on the reduction in continuing ownership interest 
by the stockholders of the target corporation from a 100 percent interest to a less 
than one percent interest in the acquiring corporation. On the boot characteri-
zation issue, the court quite inconsistently commented favorably on its rejection 
of such an integrated approach in Shimberg. 
61415 F. Supp. 832 (M.D. Fla. 1976). 
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ployed a McDonald-type analysis. It concluded that a reduction of own-
ership from 66 percent to less than one percent had occurred and that 
the boot did not have the effect of a dividend. 62 
In an entirely unsatisfactory opinion, the Fifth Circuit reversed. The 
court seemed to believe that the comparison made by the district court 
was inseparable from the section 302 meaningful reduction test. 63 Since 
the court understandably did not believe that the results produced by that 
comparison were reasonable, it quite amazingly refused to apply the 
Davis test. The court declined to follow the decision in Wright because 
that court had also applied the meaningful reduction test. Apparently, 
the Fifth Circuit did not understand that the court in Wright had not 
applied the test in the same way as the district court. Instead, the court 
concluded that any pro rata distribution of boot in a reorganization had 
the effect of a dividend-thereby virtually returning to the completely 
discredited 1945 decision in Commissioner v. Estate of Bedford.04 The 
taxpayer contended that the distribution was not pro rata because of the 
change in ownership produced by the reorganization, citing such cases 
as Zenz v. Quinlivan, but the court rejected that line of authority because 
it had arisen under section 302 and the court had already determined 
that it would not apply the tests of that section. 65 Instead, the court held 
that the distribution should be viewed as if made in a separate transaction 
prior to the reorganization. Since such a distribution would not have 
altered the proportionate interests of the stockholders, the court found 
that the distribution had the effect of a dividend. The court referred to 
the legislative history of the Revenue Act of 1924 66 which introduced 
the predecessor to section 356(a) (2). That history, the court said, pro-
vided an example of a situation in which dividend treatment was stated 
to be appropriate in "virtually the same fact situation" as the case before 
the court. 67 In fact, the example reproduced by the court involved a 
merger into a shell corporation which presumably would not have pro-
duced any change in ownership interest. 68 
62 /d. at 836. 
63 577 F.2d at 288. 
64 325 U.S. 283 (1945). Evidently aware of the harshness of its holding, the 
Court noted that while the automatic dividend rule had applied to all boot distribu-
tions, its rule applied only to pro rata distributions. 577 F.2d at 290. Both ap-
proaches are identical, however, in their simplistic effort to apply a fixed rule with-
out regard to material differences in the effect of the distributions. 
65 577 F.2d at 290 n.18. 
6 6 H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1924), reprinted in 1939-1 
(part 2) C.B. 241, 252. 
67 577 F.2d at 289. 
68 Even those commentators who favor the approach of Revenue Ruling 75-83 
have acknowledged the "shortcomings" of the Shimberg opinion. See Samansky, 
Taxation of Nonqualifying Property Distributed in Reorganizations, 31 CASE W. 
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The existing authority on the characterization of boot represents an 
extreme failure of analysis. Both the Commissioner and the two circuit 
courts that have addressed the issue concluded, with ample justification, 
that the integration approach suggested by McDonald v. Commissioner 
was unreasonably favorable to avoiding dividend equivalence. A 
thoughtful examination of the McDonald analysis would have disclosed 
that it produced unreasonable results because it improperly gave effect 
to fresh investment that expanded the corporate entity. Once the irrele-
vance of such investment is recognized, its effect can be eliminated from 
the computation of the decline in proportionate interest, thereby yielding 
a reasonable boot characterization that is consistent with the dllalysis of 
the closely analogous Zenz redemption. 
Overlapping Ownership 
A stockholder receiving boot in a reorganization who owns stock in 
both of the constituent corporations is a distinct source of confusion in 
the analysis of the boot distribution. The stockholder's interest is both 
reduced by the merger and the boot distribution and increased by the 
interest he holds in the second corporation. The question, then, is the 
relevance of this second interest to the characterization of the partial 
liquidation of the first investment. If there is a single satisfactory answer 
to this question, it is neither simple nor very tidy. Before demonstrating 
how the principles employed above might be applied to overlapping 
stockholdings, it will be profitable to review why the solutions thus far 
proposed are erroneous. 
The added fact that one or more stockholders of the target corporation 
also own stock in the acquiring corporation cannot alter the propriety of 
an integrated transaction approach. Thus, the solutions suggested in 
Revenue Ruling 75-83 and in the Wright case-the only appellate deci-
sion to have considered the character of boot in a reorganization involv-
ing both overlapping ownership and a significant change in ownership 
resulting from the merger 69-remain wrong for the reasons stated above. 
REs. L. REv. 1, 34 (1980), where the author agrees with the statement in Revenue 
Ruling 75-83 that a distribution of boot should be taxed as a dividend if the 
distribution would have been so taxed in the absence of a reorganization. How-
ever, neither he nor the ruling explains why the change in ownership attributable 
to the reorganization should be ignored when such a change is taken into account 
in analogous Zenz transactions. 
69 Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 
U.S. 1022 (1967), also involved the reorganization of two corporations in which 
there was substantial overlapping ownership. However, because the transaction 
did not change proportionate interests, the distribution incident to the reorgani-
zation clearly was not entitled to sales treatment. 
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The Wright decision, however, contains a further error that is peculiar 
to overlapping stockholdings. In Wright, it may be recalled, the court 
blended the taxpayer's two investments, treating them as one, and char-
acterized the boot distribution by reference to the aggregate disinvest-
ment. Moreover, the court treated the boot as distributed by the newly 
formed resulting corporation in exchange for its stock, rather than as a 
disposition of the stock of the constituent corporations. The Commis-
sioner, both before the court in Wright and in Revenue Ruling 75-83, 
contested each of these elements in the court's analysis. To that extent, 
the Commissioner was clearly correct. 
At the stockholder level, a reorganization is merely an exchange of one 
corporate investment for another which would be a taxable exchange 70 
but for the nonrecognition provisions of the Code.71 Under those pro-
visions, a stockholder's gain on an exchange is taxed only to the extent 
that he receives boot in addition to stock in the surviving corporation. 
If a tax is imposed on the receipt of boot, it is a tax on gain realized upon 
the exchange of stock in the target corporation for stock in the acquiring 
corporation. 72 Both in fact and in the contemplation of the reorganiza-
tion provisions of the Code, the stock disposed of is the stock of the 
target corporation. Like a simple redemption, boot in a reorganization 
may more nearly resemble either the proceeds of a sale or the distribution 
of a dividend and thus can be taxed as either. 73 Regardless of how the 
70 See, e.g., Marr v. United States, 268 U.S. 536 (1925), arising prior to the 
enactment of the reorganization provisions. There have been occasional sug· 
gestions, not generally accepted, that a nonstatutory form of reorganization may 
exist. See Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U.S. 242 (1924). See also Telephone Answering 
Serv. Co. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 423 (1974), reviewed (3 dis.), aff'd, 39 
A.F.T.R. 2d (P-H) ~ 77-786 (4th Cir. Nov. 8, 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 
( 1977). Under the existing statutory pattern, such decisions are probably best 
viewed as an expansive construction of the F reorganization. See infra note 87. 
71 For corporate reorganizations, the principal sections affecting stockholders 
are §§ 354, 355, and 356. The Code contains several other nonrecognition pro-
visions that operate similarly, including tolerances for taxable boot. See e.g., 
I.R.C. §§ 1031 through 1039. 
72 Under § 1001, gain or loss is realized on the exchange of stock in the target 
corporation. When § 356 requires that "the gain" be recognized, in the event of 
boot, it is the realized gain to which the section refers. See BrrrKER & EusTICE, 
supra note 13, at ~ 14.34. 
73 The stockholder has exchanged his interest in the target corporation for an 
interest in the acquiring corporation-the equivalent under the tax law to a sale. 
But in a merger, or practical merger under § 368(a)(1)(C), the two forms of 
acquisitive reorganization in which boot is permitted, the acquiring corporation 
becomes the continuation of the target corporation as part of the same transaction. 
Thus, the stock has been "sold" to the corporation in which the stockholder has 
an interest, the equivalent of a redemption. If that "redemption" does not pro· 
duce a material change in proportionate interest, § 356(a) (2) requires that it be 
taxed as a dividend. 
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boot is characterized, however, it remains a liquidation of a portion of 
the stockholder's prior investment, and the tax consequences of the dis-
tribution must be determined by reference to the tax attributes of the 
constituent corporation in which he was a stockholder.74 
In the absence of overlapping stock ownership, the foregoing is not 
questioned. 75 However, the mere fact that one or more stockholders of 
the target corporation may also own stock in the acquiring corporation 
does not alter the analysis. Dating back to the earliest decided cases, 70 
the taxing system has with surprising rigor recognized the corporate en-
tity as separate not only from its individual stockholders 77 but also from 
other corporations under common control. 78 Thus, an investment in one 
74 When boot is taxed as the proceeds of a sale, it is quite clear that the stock 
is the stock in the target corporation. However, when the boot is to be taxed as 
a dividend, the Code is somewhat less clear concerning whether the dividend is to 
be deemed distributed by the target or the acquiring corporation. Both § 356(a)(2) 
and the regulations thereunder require taxation as a dividend to the extent of the 
earnings and profits of "the corporation." Nevertheless, in the absence of over-
lapping ownership, commentators and practitioners alike have uniformly assumed 
the more logical answer that the distributing corporation is the one in which the 
recipient of the boot previously held an interest. See, e.g., BITTKER & Eusnca, 
supra note 13, at ~ 14.34; Vrooman, Corporate Acquisitions-(A) Reorganization, 
TAX MGMT. (BNA) No. 77-3d, A-27 (1974). The question has not been much 
addressed by the courts and when Revenue Ruling 75-83 asserted this posi-
tion, it could only adduce scant authority. Hawkinson v. Commissioner, 235 
F.2d 747 (2d Cir. 1956); Commissioner v. Owens, 69 F.2d 597 (5th Cir. 1934); 
Rossv. United States, 173 F. Supp. 793 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 875 (1959). 
75 When the distribution of boot is taxable as a dividend and both the target 
and the acquiring corporations are controlled by the same stockholder, the Com-
missioner has been reluctant to permit the taxpayer's choice of target corporations 
to control the earnings and profits limitation on dividend treatment. On such facts, 
the Commissioner has taken the rather dubious position that both corporations 
" should be regarded as transferors and thus that the earnings and profit<> of both 
could be used to support dividend taxation. Rev. Rul. 70-240, 1970-1 C.B. 81. 
While that argument was accepted in Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874 (5th 
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1022 (1967), it has more recently been re-
jected as inconsistent with the structure of § 356. Atlas Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 
614 F.2d 860 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 836 (1980); American Mfg. 
Co. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 204 (1970}, reviewed (2 dis.). Wright appears to 
be the only case in which boot entitled to sales treatment was deemed attributable 
to a disposition of stock of the acquiring corporation. 
76 Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), was partially based on this 
principle. 
77 Moline Properties v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943). For current ap-
plications of this principle, see Foglesong v. Commissioner, 621 F.2d 865 (7th 
Cir. 1980), appeal filed (Feb. 16, 1982); Strong v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 12 
(1976), reviewed, aff'd, 1977-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) CJ 9240 (2d Cir. Feb. 14, 1977). 
78 The rigidity of this doctrine has led to several specific statutory modifications. 
See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 267, 304, 482, and 1239. This latter section is illustrative. 
While assuming that, in general, such transactions are to be respected in accord-
ance with their form, under a recent expansion of § 1239, sales of depreciable 
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corporate entity is entirely separate from an investment in a second, and 
transactions affecting one such investment cannot properly be offset by 
transactions involving a second. No one would assert, for example, that 
a dividend from one wholly-owned corporation could be offset by an 
investment in a second, thereby exonerating the stockholder from tax on 
the distribution. Similarly, a reduction in proportionate ownership of 
one corporation cannot be offset by an expanded interest in a second, 
even if these shifts in investment occurred as parts of the same trans-
action. Yet, that is precisely the effect of the commingling of the stock-
holdings that occurred in Wright. 
The netting approach used in Wright measures only a fictitious change 
in ownership that does not reflect the stockholder's disinvestment in either 
of the constituent corporations. In fact, if boot is distributed with respect 
to the stock of both constituent corporations in a consolidation such as 
occurred in Wright, the stockholder's disinvestment in one corporation 
may justify sales treatment even if the disinvestment in the second does 
not. Yet the commingling approach taken in Wright conceals these dif-
ferent degrees of disinvestment and thus erroneously imposes a single 
characterization upon a fictitious aggregation. 79 
Accordingly, the Commissioner was correct in arguing in Wright that 
the consequences of the distribution of boot must be measured separately 
with respect to the stockholdings in each of the constituent corporations. 
He was also correct in asserting in Revenue Ruling 75-83 that the dis-
tribution must be regarded as a disposition of the stock of the target 
corporation in exchange for a distribution from that corporation. The 
Commissioner was in error, however, in further asserting that the char-
acterization of that distribution could be made without taking into ac-
count the change in stockholdings produced by the merger. 
In taking an integrated transaction approach to the characterization 
of boot in this context, the overlapping s~ockholdings should neither be 
taken completely into account nor completely ignored. It arguably fol-
property between two corporations, 80 percent or more of the stock of which is 
owned by the same taxpayer, are denied capital gains treatment. 
79 This effect of the Wright approach can be seen by assuming that individual 
B owns 60 of 80 shares in corporation X and 10 of 50 shares in corporation Y. 
In a consolidation, boot is distributed only to B in exchange for 25 of her X shares 
and boot is also distributed to the Y stockholders pro rata in exchange for one half 
of their stock. Under the Wright commingling approach, B's interest would be 
regarded as changing from 70/ 130, or 54% to 40/80, or 50% . Since that decline 
is not significant, B would undoubtedly receive dividend treatment under Wright. 
However, B's interest in the X assets has in fact declined from a 75% interest to a 
50% interest, a shift in interest to the other stockholders of Y that should entitle B 
to sales treatment. On the other hand, her interest in the assets of Y has increased, 
and therefore, the boot distributed to her with respect to the Y stock should 
receive dividend treatment. 
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lows from the foregoing objections to the decision in Wright that the 
continuing investment in the acquiring corporation is entirely irrelevant 
to the characterization of the disinvestment in the target corporation. 
That is, the mere retention of the investment in the acquiring corpora-
tion should neither diminish nor enhance the extent of the disposition of 
the investment in the target. On the facts of the first version of Revenue 
Ruling 75-83, in which A owned all 60 shares in the target corporation 
and ten of 40 shares in the acquiring corporation and received boot in 
exchange for 25 of his 60 shares, his holdings in the target might be 
regarded as reduced from 60/60 to 35/60, just as in the absence of over-
lapping ownership. 
The result is neither obviously reasonable nor obviously unreasonable 
in this and most other factual combinations. In some situations, how-
ever, this result is plainly wrong. Assume S owns 90 of 1 00 shares of 
stock, all having the same value, of each of the target and acquiring 
corporations and causes the distribution of boot in exchange for 50 shares 
in the target corporation. Under this analysis, S's interest would be 
deemed to decline from 90/100 to 40/100, thereby assuring S of sales 
treatment. Nevertheless, it is intuitively obvious that S did not signifi-
cantly reduce her proportionate ownership in the corporation or in the 
surviving corporation, in which she owns 130 of 150 shares or 87 per-
cent. 
Evidently, the overlapping holdings must to some extent be taken into 
account in measuring the stockholder's continuing interest. However, 
the overlapping holdings cannot simply be added to the stockholder's 
remaining holdings in the target corporation. Assume F owns 60 of 100 
shares in the target corporation and 25 of 1000 shares in the acquiring 
corporation, the shares are of equal value, and F receives boot of $25x 
in exchange for 25 of his shares in the target. If F's original holdings in 
the acquired were merely added to his remaining holdings in the target, 
he would be regarded as retaining his entire investment, notwithstanding 
the boot distribution. His interest would be regarded as changing from 
60/100 before to (60- 25 + 25)/100 after, or unchanged. This is 
plainly wrong. In the absence of any overlapping stockholdings, F would 
have been regarded as having substantially reduced his proportionate 
interest from 60/100 to 35/100, and would have been entitled to sales 
treatment. It would be unreasonable if his ownership of a nominal in-
terest in the acquiring corporation produced more than a nominal change 
in his computed ownership. On these facts, a result reasonable in ap-
pearance could be produced by applying the Wright formula, but that 
approach is wrong in principle and on other facts produces unreason-
able results. 
The basic premise of this article is that in computing a change in 
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ownership, the retained ownership must be compared with a value no 
greater than the value of the prior investment because it is only with 
respect to that value that a disposition has occurred. It was observed 
that a sale of stock at the corporate level resembles a sale at the stock-
holder level only to this extent and that further fresh investment is irrele-
vant. The denominator of the fractions that measure the proportionate 
interests after the reorganization thus includes the fresh investment only 
to the extent it replaces the investment withdrawn by the exchanging 
shareholders as boot. To the extent that this fresh investment is attribut-
able to the overlapping stockholdings in the acquiring corporation by the 
recipient of the boot distribution, the stockholder should be treated as 
retaining that proportion of his prior investment. Thus, the numerator 
of the fraction for each shareholder should include that fraction of the 
shareholder's interest in the acquiring corporation that equals the ratio 
of the replacing fresh investment to the entire value of the acquiring 
corporation. 
Assume A, who owned 60 of the 100 outstanding shares of the target, 
exchanges 35 of them for shares of the acquiring corporation of equal 
value and 25 for boot of $25x. The other shareholders of the target ex-
change stock for stock only. A owned ten of the 40 shares of the acquir-
ing corporation previously outstanding. The denominator of the fraction 
depicting A's postreorganization interest is 100, representing the value 
of the target remaining after the boot distribution ($75x) and $25x 
attributable to the fresh investment by the acquiring corporation, 
amounting to 25 I 40 of that fresh investment. The numerator of the 
fraction must be similarly determined to be 41.25, the sum of 35, the 
investment of A in the target which continues into the acquiring corpo-
ration, plus 6.25, which represents A's 25 percent interest in 25140 of 
the acquiring corporation. 
This analysis produces quite reasonable results in both of the examples 
used earlier. F owned 601100 of the target and 2511000 of the acquir-
ing corporation and received a boot distribution in exchange for 25 
shares of the target. Intuitively, it appeared that F should be regarded 
as continuing to hold just slightly more than 35 I 100 and should have 
been entitled to sales treatment. Under the suggested analysis, F would 
be regarded as retaining those 35 shares plus 2511000 of the retired 25 
shares, or 0.625 shares. In the other example, S owned 901100 of each 
corporation and received boot for 50 shares of the target. Under this 
analysis, she would be regarded as retaining 40 shares in the target 
corporation plus 901100 of the 50 shares exchanged for boot. Thus, 
her interest would be regarded as declining from 901100 to (40 + 
.9 X 50)1100, or 851100. The formula thus accurately reflects her 
nominal decline in ownership and would produce dividend treatment. 
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This solution to the problem of overlapping ownership is admittedly 
somewhat complex and cannot be derived from the simple formula con-
tained in section 302(b) (2). That section, however, does not address 
the effect of simultaneous fresh irtvestment. On the other hand, this solu-
tion can be derived from an understanding of the nature of a transaction 
involving a shift of .investment and of the relevance of fresh investment 
to that transaction. Indeed, the proper solution to the characterization 
of boot in the presence of overlapping ownership could not be obtained 
in any other manner. Moreover, obtaining a reasonable solution to this 
complex question, through the consistent application of the principles 
and analyses suggested here, provides a further indication of the validity 
of these suggestions. 
Redemption of Acquiring Corporation's Stock 
On occasion, it is the stockholders of the acquiring corporation rather 
than those of the target corporation who wish to withdraw a portion of 
their investment in connection with an acquisitive reorganization. The 
choice of the corporate entity that will survive the merger or other re-
organization is largely arbitrary.80 While a variety of tax and nontax 
factors may bear on the decision, the corporation that survives is often 
simply the one whose management originated the merger proposal. The 
stockholders of the target and acquiring corporations thus stand in an 
identical relationship to the resulting entity. Nevertheless, because the 
stockholders of the acquiring corporation do not exchange their stock 
for stock of another corporate party to the reorganization, the provisions 
that determine the tax consequences of the receipt of stock and boot in 
a reorganization do not apply to the stockholders of the acquiring corpo-
ration.81 Section 302, not section 356(a) (2), governs distributions of 
property incident to a reorganization to these stockholders. 82 
As a result, a rather nice question is presented by a partial redemption 
of stock of the acquiring corporation. Since section 302 applies, pre-
sumably the Zenz integration doctrine and the principles of Revenue 
Ruling 75-447 also apply, and the change in stockholdings is computed 
taking into account the change in ownership attributable to the merger. 
It seems just too absurd, however, to apply one set of rules to stock-
holders of the acquiring corporation and another to the stockholders of 
8o For this reason, it has been suggested that in a reorganization, both corpo-
rations and their stockholders should be treated alike. See, e.g., Turnier, Con-
tinuity of Interest-Its Application to Shareholders of the Acquiring Corporation, 
64 CAL. L. REv. 902 (1976). However, they are not. 
81 Reg.§ 1.354-1(a). 
82See Rev. Rul. 77-415, 1977-2 C.B. 311. 
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the target corporation when each group suffers an identical change in its 
relationship to the continuing corporate entity. 
The nice question is just another demonstration that Revenue Rulings 
75-83 and 75-447 are inconsistent.83 At the moment, the Commissioner 
seems willing to tolerate the inconsistency. In at least one private ruling, 
the Commissioner has applied the integration doctrine of Revenue Ruling 
7 5-44 7 to a redemption of stock from stockholders of an acquiring cor-
poration, and concluded that a substantially disproportionate redemption 
occurred. 84 Interestingly, as a result of the combination of the merger 
and redemption in this ruling, the size of the acquiring corporation re-
mained unchanged, and the transaction did not include a distribution 
of boot to stockholders of the target corporation. The nicer absurdities 
of these rulings are yet to be fully illuminated. 
Characterizing the Reorganization Itself 
It is argued here that the present rules for the taxation of corporate 
distributions accompanying new investment are inadequate. Because 
those who fashioned the rules have not focused on the proper relevance 
of the new investment to the distribution, the rules have not given the 
new investment proper effect. Under Revenue Ruling 75-447, new in-
vestment is excessively influential in the event of a corporate expansion 
through a Zenz transaction while, in characterizing boot, neither the 
courts nor the Service has given sufficient weight to the investment. Hav-
ing established an approach to analyzing fresh investment, a somewhat 
more ambitious attempt can now be made to demonstrate that, in a more 
complex version of the same shift in investment, the courts have also not 
given proper weight to new investment in fashioning the tax consequences 
to withdrawing stockholders. 
The shifting of investment addressed herein can be accomplished 
83 Since the choice of the corporation to survive the merger can frequently be 
controlled by the parties, the inconsistency of these approaches may permit the 
taxpayers to elect between sales or dividend treatment. See Horwood, Clarified 
IRS Position Enhances Planning For Stock Redemptions With New Shareholders, 
46 J. TAX'N 338 (1977). Not only is it undesirable for taxpayers to be able to 
so manipulate their tax liabilities, it is also undesirable for such quirks in the tax-
ing system to influence the form of business transactions. 
Levin, Adess & McGaffey, supra note 50, at 298-99, point out that under the 
Wright approach, which they favor, boot distributed to stockholders of the target 
is characterized in the same way regardless of which corporation is selected as the 
target. However, since Wright is not consistent with Revenue Ruling 75-447, 
distributions to the target stockholders are still characterized differently from 
distributions to stockholders of the acquiring corporation. 
84 LTR 8009108 (Dec. 10, 1979). 
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through a variety of corporate manipulations. One of the more common 
is a liquidation-reincorporation, a form of transaction which itself can 
be executed in a variety of ways. An old corporation can be completely 
liquidated and a portion of its assets contributed to a new corporation 
formed by the stockholders of the old together with the new investors. 
Alternatively, the old corporation can purport to sell a portion of its 
assets to the new corporation and then liquidate completely.s:; In either 
case, the old stockholders withdraw a portion of their investment from 
corporate solution but continue as stockholders with their proportionate 
interest diluted by the new investment Although the net effect of the 
transaction is identical to the more simple Zenz redemption, not even the 
most idealistic student of income taxation would suggest that a liquida-
tion-reincorporation can routinely be recast as a Zenz redemption.86 
The analogy may be apt, but there are competing analogies and prin-
ciples of broader application-such as the integrity of the corporate en-
tity-are at stake.87 While the liquidation-reincorporation will be ad-
dressed under a different set of rules, the relevance of fresh investment 
to the characterization of the disposition of an old investment is the same 
under any set of rules. 
The parties to such a transaction seek to achieve far more than capital 
gains taxation of the net proceeds retained by the old shareholders. If 
the steps are respected in accordance with their form as separately tax-
able transactions, the shareholders of the old corporation recognize all 
s5 For a fuller discussion of the variants of liquidation-reincorporation trans-
actions, and of the tax consequences sought by the parties, see Hjortb, Liquidations 
and Reincorporations-Before and After Davant, 42 WASH. L. REv. 737, 740-44 
(1967). 
86 However, on appropriate facts, the Commissioner bas disregarded a statutory 
merger and treated the overall transaction as a simple redemption. LTR 8025110 
(Mar. 28, 1980). 
87 While the new corporation may appear to be the mere continuation of the 
old, it is in fact a separate legal entity and is so recognized by the taxing system. 
See supra notes 77-78 and the accompanying text. Tax attributes of the old 
corporation carry over to the new only if a reorganization bas occurred. See 
I.R.C. §§ 358 (stockholder's basis), 362 (corporate basis), and 381 (other carry-
overs). Thus, the Iiquidation-reincorporation transaction normally cannot be 
reconstructed as a mere redemption. The suggestion occasionally surfaces in the 
case law and published rulings that a corporation can be a mere continuation of 
another, without reference to the statutory reorganization provisions. See, e.g., 
Helvering v. Elkhorn Coal Co., 95 F.2d 732 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 
605 (1938); Telephone Answering Serv. Co. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 423 
(1974), reviewed (3 dis.), afl'd, 39 A.F.T.R. 2d (P-H) CJ 77-786 (4th Cir. Nov. 8, 
1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977); Rev. Rul. 68-349, 1968-2 C.B. 143. 
The suggestion is probably wrong but if valid, would amount to the assertion of 
a nonstatutory from of reorganization having wholly unarticulated parameters. 
Therefore, even a "mere continuation" would involve the application of a set of 
rules far more complex than would a simple redemption. 
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gain or loss inherent in their shares. Offsetting this, the new corporation 
takes a basis for the reincorporated assets equal to their fair market value, 
and the tax attributes of the old corporation, particularly its earnings and 
profits account, disappear. However, all of these objectives are lost if 
the overall transaction is a reorganization within the meaning of section 
368(a) (1). In that event, the property retained by the old stockholders 
is boot, which may have the effect of a dividend, and the tax attributes 
of the old corporation, including the basis of its assets, carry over to the 
new corporation. In the first instance, then, the character of the corpo-
rate distribution incident to a liquidation-reincorporation transaction is 
a function of whether the transaction is a reorganization. 
At first glance, the proper definition of a corporate reorganization ap-
pears quite removed from the issues considered thus far-the character-
ization of corporate distributions in redemptions and reorganizations. At 
the level of technical statutory analysis, the issues are indeed quite differ-
ent. At the level of income tax policy, however, the issues are strikingly 
similar, except that the reorganization definition focuses attention on the 
shareholders of the old corporation as a group rather than individually 
as was previously the case. Thus, the question previously addressed was 
whether the characterization of a distribution to a particular stockholder 
should be affected by fresh investment obtained as a part of the same 
transaction. In the present context, the question is whether the character-
ization of a transaction (in the form of a liquidation-reincorporation) as 
a mere continuation of investmer..t pursuant to the reorganization pro-
visions or as a termination of that investment should be affected by the 
presence of fresh investment. In both contexts, the greater the signifi-
cance accorded to fresh investment, the greater is the likelihood that the 
shareholder will have sales treatment. 
By virtue of the wealth of detail, statutory and interpretative, accom-
panying the definition of a reorganization, a wide variety of events may 
cause a liquidation-reincorporation transaction to be regarded as suffi-
ciently altering the character of the old shareholders' investment interest 
to preclude reorganization characterization. That definitional detail, 
however, is not of present interest. It is assumed that the liquidation-
reincorporation transactions examined comply with all requirements for 
reorganization treatment except those pertaining to the question here 
addressed: the extent to which fresh investment alone can properly cause 
what would otherwise be characterized as a reorganization to be treated 
instead as a disposition subject to capital gains taxation. 
Over the surprisingly weak objections of the Commissioner, relatively 
sparse case law has established the proposition, now widely accepted, 
that the mere addition of fresh investment to a liquidation-reincorpora-
tion transaction causes the transaction to fall outside the scope of the 
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reorganization provisions of the Code. That is, in this context, fresh 
investment alone can convert a mere continuation of an incorporated 
investment into a termination of that investment, taxed as a sale. The 
granting of such extreme significance to fresh investment is inconsistent 
not only with the present rules governing Zenz redemptions and boot 
distributions but also with the rule suggested here. The consequence of 
this faulty analysis of fresh investment is that taxpayers willing to take 
this more circuitous route can obtain far more favorable income tax 
consequences for their distributions of corporate profits than can be ob-
tained through the financially identical Zenz redemption. If the rele-
vance of fresh investment to the characterization of the transaction were 
evaluated properly, the consequences of the liquidation-reincorporation 
would be virtually identical to the Zenz redemption. 
The Proper Relevance of Fresh Investment: 
Continuity of Interest Test 
Aside from the statutory detail, a transaction is a reorganization if the 
investment of the stockholders of an old corporation is continued into 
a new one in a form insufficiently altered to warrant, as a matter of tax 
policy, the imposition of tax. A finding that a transaction is not a re-
organization thus implies that the investment has been so changed that 
the transaction should be treated as a disposition of the prior investment. 
The characterization of the transaction is made on an overall basis, ad-
dressing the change in the form of the investment of the old stockholders 
as a group. 88 From the earliest cases arising under the reorganization 
provisions, the courts have been attentive to this fundamental character 
of a reorganization and have actively undertaken to limit reorganization 
treatment to transactions that, in substance, produced continuations of 
the prior investment. Independently of the statutory definition, the courts 
have evolved a judicial conception of the essence of a reorganization and 
88 The wisdom of extending nonrecognition treatment to individual stockholders 
as a function of the continuity of interest by the stockholders as a group has 
recently been questioned by the American Law Institute. AU, FEDERAL INCOME 
TAX PRoJECT (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1977) (Corporate Acquisitions (except for 
Special Limitations on Loss Carryovers)). Moreover, the study proposes to 
eliminate the continuity of interest test for reorganization treatment and disconnect 
the consequences of a corporate combination at the corporate level from the 
consequences at the stockholder level. For discussions of these proposals, see 
Beghe, The American Law Institute Subchapter C Study: Acquisitions and Dis-
tributions, 33 TAX LAw. 743 (1980); Wolfman, "Continuity of Interest" and the 
American Law Institute Study, 57 TAXES 840 (1979). The suggested downgrading 
of the continuity test is not inconsistent with the treatment of fresh investment 
suggested herein. 
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have insisted that a transaction conform to that conception before allow-
ing reorganization treatment, notwithstanding that the transaction meets 
the literal requirements of the statutory definition. 89 
One result of these judicial efforts has been the continuity of interest 
doctrine, which requires that the old stockholders as a group retain a 
"definite and substantial" proprietary interest in the affairs of the con-
tinuing corporation. 90 The continuity of interest doctrine serves a func-
tion in the reorganization definition similar to the function of section 302 
in the taxation of redemptions. The doctrine defines the reduction in the 
continuing interest of the prior stockholders that is deemed so substantial 
as to require that their exchange be taxed as a sale. Obviously, the re-
sults of this measurement are different under the reorganization provi-
sions than they are under section 302. The reorganization provisions 
require that the overall transaction be characterized as either a reorga-
nization or a taxable transaction. That characterization has implications 
with respect to the holdings of all parties to the transaction. Under sec-
tion 302, by contrast, the determination characterizes only the redemp-
tion distribution. Notwithstanding these differences in the significance 
of the determinations under the continuity of interest doctrine and section 
302, both sets of rules apply an essentially identical approach to the 
definition of a disposition. 
The standard formulation of the continuity test, now contained in 
Revenue Procedure 77-37,91 is that continuity of interest is present if 
the stockholders of the target corporation acquire stock in the acquiring 
corporation "which is equal in value, as of the effective date of the re-
organization, to at least 50 percent of the value of all of the formerly 
outstanding stock of the [target] corporation as of the same date." Con-
tinuity, therefore, is a function of the extent to which the stockholders of 
the target corporation have retained their prior investment. Their con-
tinuing interest has always been measured with respect to the value of 
that investment immediately prior to the reorganization. 
In so measuring the continuity of interest retained by the old stock-
89 In addition to the continuity of interest test, early decisions established the 
requirement that a reorganization serve a business purpose and applied a step 
transaction analysis for determining whether the spirit, as well as the form, of the 
statutory requirements had been met. See Helvering v. Elkhorn Coal Co., 95 F.2d 
732 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 605 (1938); Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 
809 (2d Cir. 1934), af}'d, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). 
90 The doctrine originated in the early decisions in Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage 
Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462 (1933), and Cortland Specialty Co. v. Com-
missioner, 60 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933). The 
ultimate form of the requirement was fashioned in LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 
415 (1940). See generally BITTKER & EusTICE, supra note 13, at ~ 14.11. 
91 § 3.02, 1977-2 C.B. 568. 
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review 
1983] FRESH INVESTMENT 461 
holders, fresh investment attributable to the acquiring corporation is 
entirely relevant.92 Without this fresh investment, there would be no 
change in the ownership of the target corporation as a result of corporate 
distributions incident to the transaction and no occasion to question the 
continuity of ownership. The corporation might contract and the propor-
tionate interests in the corporation might shift among the old stock-
holders but, absent new investment or direct sales of stock to new in-
vestors, the old stockholders as a group would retain complete ownership 
of the resulting corporation. Therefore, to the extent that fresh invest-
ment obtained in a reincorporation produces a result that is the func-
tional equivalent of a direct sale of stock at the shareholder level, that 
investment creates a discontinuity of interest. However, fresh investment 
attributable to the acquiring corporation which has the effect of expand-
ing the resulting corporate entity beyond the preacquisition size of the 
target is wholly irrelevant to the test and, thus, to the characterization of 
the reorganization.93 As a result, the proportionate interests of the old 
stockholders in the resulting corporation are not relevant. A reorganiza-
tion remains free of tax and is not treated as a disposition even if the old 
stockholders convert their 100 percent interest in the target into an in-
significant fractional interest in the acquiring corporation. 
While the formulation of the continuity of interest test in Revenue 
Procedure 77-37 is entirely appropriate in the context of acquisitive re-
organizations resulting in corporate expansions, the context in which the 
rule was fashioned, it must be modified to accommodate corporate con-
tractions, which typically occur in liquidation-rcincorporations. In any 
such transaction in which the old stockholders withdraw from corporate 
solution an amount exceeding 50 percent of the net worth of the target 
corporation, the test as formulated by Revenue Procedure 77-37 is not 
met. Even in the total absence of fresh investment, a pro rata distribu-
tion of liquid assets incident to a reincorporation thus may cause the 
transaction to fail the continuity of interest test under this formulation 
and to be treated as a complete liquidation. Since the old stockholders 
have retained complete ownership of their incorporated investment in 
this case, the result is plainly wrong. A mere distribution not accom-
92 More generally, any transfer of an ownership interest from the old stock-
holders of the target corporation to a new owner is relevant to the continuity of 
interest test. Thus, discontinuity can also be produced by a direct sale of stock 
by a target stockholder, incident to the reorganization, whether to the acquiring 
corporation or to an outsider to the transaction. See Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 
C.B. 568. Whether a sale is factually related to the reorganization can pose a 
difficult question. See McDonald's, Inc. v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 972 (1981), 
rev'd, 688 F.2d 520, (7th Cir. 1982). 
93 See, e.g., Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378 (1935); General 
Housewares Corp. v. United States, 615 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1980). 
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panied by any shift in proportionate interest does not amount to a dis-
position; reorganization treatment is clearly appropriate. 
Neither the Commissioner nor the courts have applied this traditional 
formulation of the continuity of interest doctrine to a corporate con-
traction incident to a liquidation-reincorporation transaction. In Reve-
nue Ruling 61-156,94 in which the Commissioner set forth his basic posi-
tion with respect to such transactions, the net worth of the resulting 
corporation was approximately one third of the value of the liquidated 
predecessor. Stockholders of the old corporation obtained 45 percent 
of the stock of the new corporation while new investors acquired 55 per-
cent. Although the ruling does not expressly define the continuity of 
interest test that it applied, it treats the old shareholders as retaining a 
45 percent continuity of interest which, the ruling concludes, was suffi-
cient to permit reorganization characterization. Similarly, in the two 
cases in which the Commissioner has asserted that liquidation-reincor-
porations were F reorganizations, notwithstanding the presence of fresh 
investment, the transactions produced substantial corporate contrac-
tions. 05 While in both cases reorganization treatment was denied, in 
neither did the court suggest that the absence of continuity of interest 
was a factor in the decision. 96 
Consistently with the measurement of the continuing proportionate 
interest of a stockholder following a simple redemption, in a reorganiza-
tion resulting in a corporate contraction, continuity must be measured 
with respect to the value of the continuing corporate entity. Continuity 
of interest is present in such a case if the stockholders of the old corpo-
ration emerge from the transaction owning at least 50 percent of the stock 
of the resulting corporation, giving full effect to any fresh investment. 
This continuity of interest test takes fresh investment into account, for 
the purpose of determining whether a disposition should be taxed as a 
sale, in exactly the same manner as it is suggested here that section 302 
should take fresh investment into account, for the same purpose, in con-
nection with a Zenz redemption or a boot distribution. To the extent 
94 1961-2 C.B. 62. 
95 Berghash v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 743 (1965), af}'d, 361 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 
1966); Gallagher v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 144 (1962), acq., reviewed (3 dis.). 
96 A corporate contraction commonly occurs in a recapitalization consitituting 
a reorganization under§ 368(a) (1) (E). In that context, the courts and the Com-
missioner have agreed that continuity of interest is not broken merely because a 
majority of the stock is exchanged for debt. However, this result has been 
achieved, not by recognizing that a modification of the continuity doctrine must 
be made for corporate contractions, but by asserting that the doctrine does not 
apply to E reorganizations. See Hickok v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 80 (1959), 
nonacq., 1959-2 C.B. 8, nonacq. withdrawn, 1977-2 C.B. 3; Rev. Rul. 77-415, 
1977-2 C.B. 311. 
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that the old stockholders shift their ownership of the old corporation to 
new investors through the combined effect of a corporate distribution and 
fresh investment, but only to that extent, the fresh investment is relevant 
to the characterization of the transaction. 
If a corporate combination meets this continuity of interest test, the 
presence of fresh investment should not be a ground for denying reorga-
nization treatment. The relevance of fresh investment to the reorganiza-
tion definition is given full effect in the continuity of interest doctrine; 
the investment has no greater relevance. 
Fresh investment is not given any greater relevance in an acquisitive 
reorganization or Zenz transaction. An acquisitive reorganization which 
passes the continuity of interest test is not barred from reorganization 
treatment regardless of the further level of fresh investment that may be 
obtained. There is no reason for a different approach to fresh investment 
in the context of an F reorganization than is applied by the courts to an 
acquisitive reorganization or to an analogous Zenz redemption. Fresh 
investment alone is not reflective of a disposition and does not alter the 
character of a reincorporation any more than it alters the character of an 
acquisitive reorganization or a Zenz redemption. 
Nevertheless, the courts have attached a significantly greater impor-
tance to fresh investment in the definitions of the nondivisive D and the 
F reorganizations. While that greater importance may arguably have 
been required by the specific statutory requirements for the nondivisive 
D reorganization, its significance to the F reorganization is entirely of 
judicial manufacture. In so exalting the importance of fresh investment 
in the definition of the F reorganization, the courts committed a clear 
error which allows taxpayers to obtain far different tax consequences 
upon a shift in investment executed pursuant to a liquidation-reincorpo-
ration than pursuant to a Zenz redemption. 
Historical Treatment of 
Liquidation-Reincorporations 
The statutory definitions of the several categories of reorganizations 
have become excessively technical and complex. Fortunately for present 
purposes, little of that technicality is of interest. Broadly speaking, three 
types of reorganizations are recognized by section 368: acquisitive,07 
97 Acquisitive reorganizations are described in§§ 36S(a)(l)(A), (B), and (C) 
as including, respectively, statutory mergers and consolidations, stock acquisitions, 
and asset acquisitions, including countless hybrids and variations. For such re-
organizations, the statutory requirements are quite technical and precise. For that 
reason, only the most extraordinary failure of planning could cause a liquidation-
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divisive,98 and merely formaJ.9 9 If a liquidation-reincorporation trans-
action is to be a reorganization, it must fall within the last category, 
specifically the nondivisive D or F reorganization. 
The D Reorganization 
In the earliest efforts to impose reorganization treatment on these 
transactions, the Commissioner relied upon the nondivisive D.100 That 
provision, however, together with the provisions of section 354 with 
which the distribution must comply, imposes an impressive series of pre-
requisites to reorganization treatment, which, if applied at all literally, 
would have made the nondivisive D a useless weapon against the liquida-
tion-reincorporation.101 It requires that a "corporation" transfer "sub-
stantially all" 102 of its assets to another corporation and then distribute 
reincorporation transaction to fall within the definition of one of the acquisitive 
reorganizations. 
os Divisive reorganizations are endorsed by one of the two categories of re-
organizations described in § 368(a)(1)(D). The D reorganization contemplates 
the formation of a corporate subsidiary, but then requires that the stock of the 
subsidiary be distributed to the stockholders of the parent in a manner that com-
plies with either § 354 or § 355. A divisive reorganization is one in which the 
distribution complies with § 355; that can only occur if after the transaction two 
or more corporations exist and are actively engaged in business. I.R.C. § 355(b)(l). 
Thus, the transactitons in question normally cannot be a divisive D reorganization. 
99 In addition to the two reorganizations discussed in the text, § 368{a) (1) (E) 
treats a recapitalization as a reorganization. However, since that provision ap-
pears limited to the recapitalization of a single corporation, a reincorporation 
cannot normally be an E reorganization. See BITTKER & EusTICE, supra note 13, 
at 1) 14.17. 
A reincorporation may encompass not only a shift in investment but also an 
alteration in the nature of the securities retained by the old stockholders. In that 
event, before nonrecognition treatment can be imposed upon the transaction, it 
may need to be regarded as an E reorganization and another form of formal re-
organization. That necessity creates considerable confusion for, in a startling and 
quite off-hand passage in an early opinion, the Supreme Court once remarked that 
to obtain reorganization treatment, a transaction must consist of only one of the 
formal changes. Helvering v. Southwest Consol. Corp., 315 U.S. 194 (1942). 
Thus, if the transactions combined two immaterial changes, it could not be a re-
organization. While the logic of that limitation is elusive at best and the Service 
has announced its disagreement with the Court (Rev. Rul. 61-156, 1961-2 C.B. 
62), it remains uncertain what result would be reached by the Supreme Court 
today. The requirement of only one formal change per transaction may remain 
as a technical limitation upon the treatment of the transaction in question as a 
reorganization. 
100 Baker, Recent Developments in the Service's War Against Liquidation-
Reincorporations, 49 J. TAX'N 82 (1978). See also Lane, The Reincorporation 
Game: Have the Ground Rules Really Changed?, 77 HARv. L. REV. 1218 (1964). 
101 Hertzog, The Reincorporation Problem in Subchapter C: A Question of 
Semantics?, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 928, 930-31 {1968). 
10 2 I.R.C. § 354(b)(1). 
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all of its property, including the stock or other property received in ex-
change for its assets, to its stockholders "in exchange" for their stock in 
the old corporation.103 Moreover, these stockholders must then "con-
trol" the newly formed corporation by owning at least 80 percent of the 
voting power of its outstanding stock and 80 percent of the number of 
all nonvoting shares outstanding.104 
From the very beginning, however, the courts adopted extremely ho-
eral constructions of the requirements of the nondivisive D when they 
were needed to impose reorganization treatment upon what appeared a 
mere reincorporation of the predecessor corporation. The transfer of as 
little as 15 percent of the assets of the old corporation has been regarded 
as "substantially all" when these assets permitted the continuation of the 
old business.105 The requirement that the old corporation distribute all 
of its property has in effect been waived, the court treating the retained 
property as constructively distributed and reinvested.106 Similarly, the 
predicate for nonrecognition at the stockholder level, an exchange of 
securities, has been ignored when the stockholders received the stock of 
the new corporation directly upon its formation. 107 
On the other hand, the courts, almost uniformly, have been unwilling 
to introduce any degree of flexibility in the requirement that the old 
stockholders must control the new corporation. No decision has found 
a D reorganization where over 20 percent of the stock of the new corpo-
ration was owned by persons who had not been stockholders in the old 
corporation or closely related to these stockholders.108 In general, the 
Commissioner does not appear to have seriously argued that a D could 
be found on such facts. In Gallagher v. Commissioner, 100 the first case 
arising under the 1954 Code to present such facts, the Commissioner 
1o3 I.R.C. § 368(a) (1) (D). 
104 I.R.C. § 368(c). 
105 Smothers v. United States, 642 F.2d 894 (5th Cir. 1981). See also Moffatt 
v. Commissioner, 363 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1016 
(1967). 
106 Grubbs v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 42 (1962), reviewed. 
107 Smothers v. United States, 642 F.2d 894 (5th Cir. 1981); James Armour, 
Inc. v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 295 (1964), appeal dismissed. 
1os Although the stock attribution rules of the Code are not applicable to the 
reorganization provisions in general or to the 80 percent requirement of § 
368(a)(1)(D) in particular, the Commissioner has succeeded in two relatively 
recent cases in persuading a court to find a D reorganization although over 20 
percent of the stock of the new corporation was owned by persons who were not 
stockholders of the old corporation but were related to the continuing stockholders. 
Ringwalt v. United States, 549 F.2d 89 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 906 
(1977) (Clifford trust); Stanton v. United States, 512 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1975) 
(wife). For an earlier decision to the contrary, see Breech v. United States, 439 
F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1971). 
109 39 T.C. 144 (1962), acq., reviewed (3 dis.). 
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specifically declined to assert the application of the D reorganization. 
Three years later, the argument was made in Berghash v. Commis-
sioner, 110 but only in a relatively weak form and as a secondary argu-
ment. It is far from clear why the Commissioner and the courts, which 
had shown such creativity in avoiding the other statutory requirements 
for a D reorganization, lapsed into such literalism in the face of fresh 
investment. The substantive distortion of the statutory description of the 
D reorganization that would result from a relaxation of the requirement 
of 80 percent control would be no greater than the distortion that oc-
curred in relaxing the requirements that the old corporation transfer sub-
stantially all of its assets to the new corporation and that it distribute all 
of its remaining assets to its stockholders in exchange for their stock. It 
can be inferred that the courts, and possibly the Commissioner, perceived 
that the addition of fresh investment possesses a substantive importance 
that could not be brushed aside, that fresh investment is not compatible 
with a formal reorganization.U1 
uo 43 T.C. 743 (1965), aff'd, 361 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1966). The Commissioner 
placed reliance upon the finding of an F reorganization under the approach set 
forth in Revenue Ruling 61-156, 1961-2 C.B. 62, discussed infra in text accom-
panying notes 112-117. 
111 There is some support for the suspicion that the Commissioner was at least 
equivocal regarding the relationship between fresh investment and the nonacquisi-
tive reorganizations in the Commissioner's contemporaneous, and perhaps continu-
ing, attitude towards the divisive D reorganization. While the Commissioner was 
somewhat reluctantly arguing that fresh investment perhaps ought not destroy a 
nondivisive D reorganization, he was quite clearly asserting that fresh investment 
should destroy a divisive D. 
It sometimes happens that an acquiring corporation in a contemplated acquisi-
tive reorganization does not wish to take all of the assets of the target company. 
One solution is to segregate the unwanted assets into a separate corporate entity 
which is distributed to the stockholders of the target company prior to the acqui-
sition in what the taxpayers characterize as a tax-free, divisive D reorganization. 
For many years, the Commissioner took the position that a subsequent acquisitive 
reorganization involving either the old corporation or its newly distributed sub-
sidiary would destroy the tax-free character of the divisive reorganization for the 
stated reason that divisive and acquisitive reorganizations were inherently in-
compatible. See Commissioner v. Morris Trust, 367 F.2d 794, 799-800 (4th Cir. 
1966). Although the illogic of the Commissioner's position did not prevail, and 
this limitation of the divisive D has now been somewhat eroded, his litigating 
position with respect to the divisive D reorganization was plainly inconsistent 
with a liquidation-reincorporation analysis. 
Moreover, the Commissioner apparently continues to adhere to a strict applica-
tion of the control requirement for a divisive D reorganization. When the corpo-
rate division involves a preexisting subsidiary, the transaction need only comply 
with the distribution requirements of § 355 and does not have to be a D reorgani-
zation. I.R.C. § 355(a)(2)(C). In that situation, the Commissioner will not 
attack an acquisitive reorganization involving either the old parent or the old 
subsidiary. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 75-406, 1975-2 C.B. 125. Nor will the Com-
missioner attack an acquisitive reorganization involving the distributing corpora-
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The F Reorganization 
Rather than confront this statutory limitation on the use of the D re-
organization, the Commissioner turned to the F reorganization. Early 
case law, however, had suggested that this type of reorganization, de-
scribed in section 368(a) (1) (F) as a "mere change in identity, form, 
or place of organization, however effected," was of very narrow scope.112 
Perhaps for that reason, the Commissioner has not argued that such a 
reorganization can include the obtaining of fresh investment by a con-
tinuing corporation. Rather, in Revenue Ruling 61-156,113 the Com-
missioner adopted the position that even though fresh investment was 
obtained contemporaneously with a reincorporation and as a part of a 
single overall plan, the investment could nevertheless be regarded as a 
"separate transaction" from the reincorporation. 
The ruling addressed a transaction in which an existing corporation 
formed a shell corporation to which it transferred all of its assets in ex-
change for stock and notes of the shell and cash obtained through a bor-
rowing. Immediately following this reincorporation, the old corporation 
was liquidated, and the new corporation made a public issue of its stock, 
leaving the old stockholders with a 45 percent interest in the new corpo-
ration and the new investors with 55 percent The ruling divided the 
transaction into three components: the public offering, the reincorpora-
tion and the recapitalization, and the distribution. The analysis of the 
relationships among these components was vague at best. The ruling 
asserted that the fresh investment could be "disregarded as being a sepa-
rate transaction" in analyzing the balance of the transaction because the 
"dominant purpose" of the transaction was to withdraw funds from a con-
tinuing corporate entity and that purpose was achieved without the stock 
issuance. The ruling contained no facts to support its characterization 
of the dominant purpose of the transaction, except that the amount of the 
distribution to the old stockholders exceeded the amount of the fresh 
tion following aD reorganization. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 68-603, 1968-2 C.B. 148; 
Rev. Rul. 70-434, 1970-2 C.B. 83. However, to date, the Commissioner has not 
endorsed the acquisition of a distributed corporation, newly formed in a D re-
organization. Rather, the Commissioner appears to take the position that such an 
acquisition would violate the control requirement of a D reorganization, thus 
destroying the D .and possibly converting the acquisitive reorganization into a tax-
able transaction. See Rev. Rul. 70-225, 1970-1 C.B. 80. See generally Handler, 
Variations on a Theme: The Disposition of Unwanted Assets, 35 TAX L. REV. 389 
(1980). The anomaly so produced seems less reflective of principle than of 
technical construction. 
112 In Helvering v. Southwest Consol. Corp., 315 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1942), the 
Supreme Court bad stated that "a transaction which shifts the ownership of the 
proprietary interest in a corporation is hardly 'a mere change in identity, form, or 
place of incorporation.' " 
113 1961-2 C.B. 62. 
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investment. It thus was unclear whether the Commissioner was referring 
to particular, undisclosed facts of the transaction in question or was sug-
gesting that such a purpose, and thus separation, could always be inferred 
from a reincorporation transaction resulting in a corporate contraction. 
In the former case, which seems unlikely, the ruling would not be of 
general significance. In the latter, the analysis is flatly inconsistent with 
other applications of the step transaction doctrine. Most particularly, 
the ruling, under the latter reading, is contrary to the Zenz integration 
doctrine which the Commissioner has fully accepted and repeatedly 
extended.114 
The separate treatment of the fresh investment, the ruling concluded, 
permitted the treatment of the balance of the transaction as an "(E) and 
(F)" reorganization "coupled with a withdrawal of funds." ur; The am-
biguous word "coupled" likely reflects the Commissioner's uncertainty 
about the separate character of that aspect of the transaction. While 
the ruling concluded that the distribution was separate from the reorga-
nization, it contained no independent reasoning with respect to the issue 
and merely contained the non sequitur that "viewing the issuance of 
stock . . . as a transaction separate from the reorganization, it is con-
cluded that the distribution" should be treated as a separate dividend 
taxable under section 301.116 
While the analysis contained in Revenue Ruling 61-156 is thus some-
what obscure, the Commissioner seemed to be asserting that the two 
corporate actions were lacking a sufficient identity of purpose and inter-
dependence to be treated as factually related. By negative implication 
the ruling thus appeared to concede the relevance of fresh investment to 
the characterization of the transaction and the incompatibility of fresh 
investment and a formal reorganization occurring as parts of the same 
transaction. With this concession, reorganization treatment was pre-
cluded unless the Commissioner was able to pursuade a court that the 
investment and the reincorporation were factually unrelated. 
In two cases arising shortly after the publication of Revenue Ruling 
61-156, the Commissioner was unable to pursuade the Tax Court of 
this. 117 Consequently, the court concluded that far more had occurred 
than a mere shift in the place of incorporation and that the transaction 
could not be considered an F reorganization. 
114 When Revenue Ruling 61-156 was issued, the Zenz doctrine had not been 
expanded to its present scope. However, the Commissioner has yet to refine the 
approach taken in the 1961 ruling. 
115 1961-2 C.B. 62, 63. 
116 Id. at 65. 
117 Berghash v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 743 (1965), afl'd, 361 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 
1966); Gallagher v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 144 (1962), acq., reviewed (3 dis.). 
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Inadequacy of Current Law 
As a result of relatively slim case law, the characterization of corporate 
distributions incident to a liquidation-reincorporation has come to be 
controlled by the level of fresh investment attracted as a part of the trans-
action.118 Transactions that otherwise would be regarded as possessing 
a sufficient continuity of investment interest to be treated either as non-
divisive D or as F reorganizations are instead treated as taxable disposi-
tions of the prior investment in the presence of fresh investment. As a 
result, corporate distributions by way of a purported corporate dissolu-
tion are automatically eligible for favorable capital gains taxation rather 
than being subjected to the more discriminating tests of section 302, 
applicable to redemptions or reorganization boot. 
This is plainly in error, as can be demonstrated by examining the 
factual circumstances presented in Gallagher v. Commissioner.110 In a 
classic liquidation-reincorporation, five stockholders of the old corpora-
tion who owned 62 percent of its stock formed a new corporation which 
purchased the assets of the old. The five stockholders acquired 72 per-
cent of the stock of the new corporation and the balance was acquired 
by seven employees of the company. In the liquidation of the old corpo-
ration, approximately $400,000 was distributed to stockholders who did 
not participate in the new company and $670,000 was distributed to the 
five continuing stockholders, of which $220,000 was reinvested in the 
new corporation. The new investors contributed a total of $82,000 for 
their stock. 
The Gallagher transaction could as easily have been accomplished by 
a Zenz redemption in which the stockholders of the old corporation 
caused all or a portion of their stock to be redeemed and the corporation 
sold new stock to its employees. Since the corporation did not expand 
as a result of the new investment, Revenue Ruling 75-447 properly 
would be applicable to the characterization of the distributions to the 
continuing stockholders. Since four of the five continuing stockholders 
increased their proportionate interests in the corporation, the distribu-
tions to them would fail the substantially disproportionate test and most 
likely would be found to be dividend equivalents. One continuing stock-
holder reduced his proportionate interest from 21 percent to ten percent 
and he, along with those completely terminated, would have been en-
titled to sales treatment. 
ns Notwithstanding the relative paucity of authority, the commentators have 
generally assumed that the courts will not find an F reorganization when material 
new investment is present. See, e.g., BITTKER. & EUSTICE, supra note 13, at Cj 
14.54.3; Hjorth, supra note 85, at 759-60; Lane, supra note 100, at 1248-49. 
119 39 T.C. 144 (1962), acq., reviewed (3 dis.). 
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If the transaction had been found to be a reorganization, comparable 
tax consequences would have obtained. The old stockholders would 
have been taxed only on the. cash boot distributed to them. As demon-
strated earlier, the proper characterization of the boot would parallel the 
characterization that would be imposed in a Zenz redemption and con-
sistent results thus would be obtained with respect to these two forms of 
functionally equivalent transactions. The effects of the transaction at the 
corporate level would also parallel the consequences of a Zenz redemp-
tion. The tax attributes of the old corporation, including its earnings and 
profits 120 and the basis for the assets remaining in corporate solution, 121 
would be preserved, while the basis of assets acquired with the newly 
contributed cash would equal the full value of those assets. Thus, in a 
reorganization, the income tax consequences to each of the parties would 
be appropriately tailored to the financial effect of the transaction upon 
each of them. For that reason, the finding of a reorganization, where 
appropriate, will normally produce superior tax results than will the 
contrary finding. 
By contrast, the failure of the court in Gallagher to find a reorganiza-
tion produced quite different results. The continuing stockholder who 
substantially reduced his interest recognized all gain inherent in his stock-
holdings, notwithstanding that a portion of that investment was not, in 
substance, withdrawn from corporate solution. The remaining four stock-
holders also obtained capital gains taxation qespite their increased pro-
portionate interests. Gallagher suggests that as long as the new investors 
acquire more than 20 percent of the stock of the new company, sales 
treatment is achieved even if all of the stockholders of the old corpora-
tion continue in the new corporation, their proportionate interests do 
not change materially, and the net distribution retained by them is wholly 
pro rata. 122 
Prospects for a Judicial Solution 
Although the early judicial construction of the F reorganization 
seemed to establish a narrow and technical scope for the provision, it is 
clear that the significance so extended to fresh investment was not only 
wrong in principle but also produced wrong substantive results to the 
parties to the transaction. There is some evidence in the more recent 
cases in which the scope of the F reorganization has been considered that 
120 I.R.C. § 381(c)(2). 
121 I.R.C. § 362(b). 
122 Indeed, the effect of the Gallagher approach on such a rcincorporation 
would be to impose a moratorium upon dividend treatment not unlike the results 
of applying Revenue Ruling 75-447 literally to a corporate expansion. 
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the courts are beginning to recognize that the earlier approach was erro-
neous and that in the future fresh investment may be accorded a more 
appropriate significance. 
In several cases, beginning with Davant v. Commissioner, 123 the courts 
have held that corporate distributions, even if resulting in material shifts 
in proportionate ownership, did not destroy what would otherwise be an 
F reorganization because the distributions were irrelevant to the char-
acterization of the transaction. In Davant, the Fifth Circuit held that the 
combination of two corporations under common control accompanied 
by a distribution (found to be the equivalent of a dividend) of $900,000 
constituted an F reorganization. With little hesitation, the court con-
cluded that the mere distribution of unneeded cash did not alter the char-
acter of the transaction as a mere change in form within the meaning of 
the reorganization provisions. Later that year, the same court, in Reef 
Corp. v. Commissioner, 124 found a reincorporation was an F reorganiza-
tion, notwithstanding that the holders of 48 percent of the stock of the 
old corporation were completely redeemed as a part of the transaction. 
The court reasoned that neither the reincorporation nor the redemption 
effected a sufficient change in the character of the continuing investment 
to deny reorganization treatment and that the combination of these two 
corporate actions should not produce a different result. While the reason-
ing of the court in Reef is not compelling-the whole may, contrary to 
the court's view, exceed the sum of its parts-the Fifth Circuit correctly 
perceived that a shift in proportionate ownership was not relevant to the 
characterization of a reincorporation. 
Significantly, the court in Reef also observed that it might have reached 
a different conclusion "if the change in proprietary interests were to new 
persons and less than 50% of the former stockholders' interest in the old 
corporation remained in the new corporation." 12:~ The court appeared 
to be suggesting that an F reorganization might properly be found in the 
presence of any shift in proportionate ownership which does not violate 
the continuity of interest doctrine. 
This suggestion in Reef was subsequently repeated by the Second Cir-
cuit in a case posing similar facts. In Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. 
United States/26 the court examined a transaction designed to eliminate 
minority stockholders who owned 38 percent of the stock of a subsidiary 
corporation of the corporate taxpayer. The parent corporation formed a 
1:!3 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1022 (1967). The 
holdings in some of these cases have subsequently been limited by statutory amend-
ment. See note 128 infra. 
124 368 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1018 (1967). 
12:; Id. at 137. 
126 568 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1976). 
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new shell subsidiary, merged the existing subsidiary into the shell, and 
caused the issuance of parent company stock to the minority stock-
holders. The court concluded that the transaction was an F reorganiza-
tion, notwithstanding what it characterized as the redemption of over 3 8 
percent of the stock of the reorganized corporation. The court specifi-
cally stated that the redemption of a minority of the stockholders of a 
corporation as part of a reincorporation transaction was not inconsistent 
with F reorganization treatment. 
The court noted that the prohibition against shifts in proprietary in-
terest in connection with F reorganizations derived from a "broad dictum" 
in the opinion of the Supreme Court in Helvering v. Southwest Consoli-
dated Corp. 127 While Southwest had involved the virtual elimination of 
the stockholders of the old corporation in an insolvency reorganization, 
in the case at hand "there was merely a shift in the proprietary interest 
of the minority stockholders." Having thus deprecated the restrictive 
prior decisions, the Second Circuit noted its agreement with the Fifth 
Circuit that while the traditional continuity of interest doctrine was ap-
plicable to the F reorganization, fresh investment not violating that rule 
should not destroy an F reorganization. 
While the full import of this line of decisions cannot now be known, 
they demonstrate at the very least that the courts no longer regard them-
selves as bound by the narrow and inflexible construction of the F re-
organization that influenced the decision in Gallagher. Moreover, these 
two circuits have clearly held that corporate action which is undertaken 
simultaneously with a reincorporation, but is not relevant to the char-
acterization of that transaction, can be ignored in testing for the presence 
of an F reorganization. While both cases involved shifts in interest at-
tributable to corporate distributions, no reason appears for treating shifts 
in ownership attributable to fresh investment differently. Indeed, lan-
guage from the opinion in Reef, quoted by the Second Circuit, suggests 
as much. It seems reasonable, therefore, to conclude that the congres-
sional formulation of the definition of the F reorganization does not pre-
clude the judicial construction of that provision consistently with the 
general principles governing the finding of a reorganization. Under such 
a construction, fresh investment not violating the continuity of interest 
doctrine is irrelevant to the characterization of a liquidation-reincorpo-
ration.128 
1 2 7 Id. at 823 n.15. 
128 The application of the F reorganization to liquidation-reincorporation trans-
actions has been somewhat limited by the addition in 1982 of the requirement that 
the reorganization be "of one corporation." Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 255 (a), 96 Stat. 
324 (1982). The amendment was intended to prohibit F reorganization treat-
ment of a combination of two or more operating companies, such as occurred in 
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Characterization of Distributions 
If a liquidation-reincorporation is deemed a reorganization, the 
amounts retained by the stockholders should be characterized under the 
reorganization ru1es. That is, the net amount retained should be viewed 
as a distribution by a continuing corporation to its stockholders in ex-
change for a portion of their stock in connection with a reorganization. 
It wou1d appear that this amount shou1d thus be treated as boot in a re-
organization, its character determined in the same manner as in other 
boot distributions. Under the approach to boot characterization sug-
gested above, the boot would be characterized under the same tests that 
are applicable to the characterization of redemptions. Thus, the con-
sequences to a participant in a liquidation-reincorporation would parallel 
the consequences to a participant in a Zenz redemption. 
In Revenue Ru1ing 61-156, however, the Commissioner appeared to 
adopt a contrary view. The ruling held that a liquidation-reincorporation 
was a reorganization. The retained assets, however, were not treated 
as boot. Rather, they were characterized as though they had been dis-
tributed to the stockholders in a distribution separate from the reorga-
nization. The ruling did not consider the possibility that such a separate 
distribution might be a redemption taxable under section 302 but instead 
asserted that the distribution was taxable as a dividend under section 
301. 
For present purposes, it is unnecessary to address the still open ques-
tion of whether distributions incident to an F reorganization constitute 
boot taxable under section 356 or are to be taxed outside of the reorga-
nization provisions.1 !!11 Regardless of the ultimate resolution of this doubt, 
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. United States, 568 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1976), which 
otherwise constitutes another form of reorganization but is categorized as an F 
reroganization solely for the purpose of obtaining the more favorable limitations 
on net operating loss carrybacks available under§ 381(b). See CoNF. REP. No. 
760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 540 ( 1982). There was no suggestion that the amend-
ment was designed to restrict the use of the F reorganization in attacking 
liquidation-reincorporations, although such a restriction appears unavoidable. 
Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 
1022 (1967), for example, involved the combination of two operating companies 
and presumably could not be regarded as an F reorganization under the amend-
ment. Moreover, taxpayers may now be well advised to operate both the old and 
the new corporation for a period of time before combining all operating assets in 
the new corporation and dissolving the old. While the more transparent of such 
schemes should not avoid F characterization, the Commissioner's technical prob-
lems in securing reorganization treatment for Iiquidation-reincorporation trans-
actions plainly have been increased under the amendment 
l29 Compare Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. 
denied, 386 U.S. 1022 (1967), with American Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 
204 (1970), reviewed (2 dis.). 
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the effect of the fresh investment should be the same. In 1961, when the 
ruling was issued, dividend treatment of the distributio~ may have ap-
peared appropriate because the automatic dividend rule was then applied 
to boot in reorganizations and it was entirely unclear whether the Zenz 
integration doctrine was applicable to partial redemptions. Today, how-
ever, it is clear that whether a distribution is regarded as boot incident 
to a reorganization or as a discretely taxable event, it is taxed as a sale 
if, as in the ruling, it occurs as part of a transaction in which the pro-
portionate ownership of the old stockholders in reduced from 100 per-
cent to 45 percent. 
If the distribution constitutes reorganization boot, it should be taxed 
in the manner set forth in the earlier section of this article on boot. Con-
versely, if the distribution is regarded as separate from the reorganization 
exchange, it nevertheless is a distribution in exchange for a portion of the 
recipient's interest in the continuing corporation and should be tested for 
dividend equivalence under the rules of section 302. There is no basis 
whatsoever for avoiding the application of that section simply because 
the redemption assumed the form of a distribution in complete liquida-
tion. Indeed, even in Gallagher, the court construed the Commissioner's 
argument in favor of taxation under section 301 as an assertion that the 
distributions failed the tests of section 302 and for that reason were to be 
taxed under section 301.130 The more recent cases finding an F reorga-
nization have assumed that distributions to minority stockholders whose 
interests were terminated constituted redemptions taxable as sales.131 If 
distributions incident to an F reorganization can be redemptions taxable 
as sales pursuant to the complete termination rule of section 302(b) (3), 
no reason appears why a distribution cannot be similarly taxed under the 
substantially disproportionate rule of section 302(b) (2). Indeed, the 
notion that the consummation of an F reorganization should bar sale 
treatment for a concurrent redemption, thereby producing a harsher tax 
than would be imposed on distributions occurring in the absence of the 
reorganization, is the nonsensical result obtained under the now discarded 
automatic dividend rule. Since the dividend characterization contained 
in the 1961 ruling is presumably derived from that rule, it too should now 
be discarded. Accordingly, whether the distribution is taxable under 
section 302 or under section 356, the tax consequences to the parties to 
a liquidation-reincorporation can be made consistent with the conse-
130 39 T.C. at 155. See also Hertzog, supra note 101, at 945-47. The author 
suggests that the government would have improved its chances of victory in 
Gallagher and Berghash if it had conceded the application of § 302. 
13 1 Reef Corp. v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 
386 U.S. 1018 (1967). See also Casco Prods. Corp. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 32 
(1967), reviewed (5 dis.). 
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quences that would be obtained if they had chosen to structure their 
transaction as a Zenz redemption.132 
Conclusion 
The more favorable treatment that taxpayers have obtained in liquida-
tion-reincorporations than in redemptions has been attributable to the 
difficulty that the Service and the courts have experienced in attempting 
to quantify the effect of fresh investment on the characterization of 
formal reorganizations. Instead of directly addressing the relevance of 
fresh investment to the finding of a reorganization, the Commissioner 
sought victory by manipulating the definition of the relevant transaction 
-the same unsatisfactory approach later adopted to obtain a favorable 
characterization of boot. When his unpersuasive separate transaction 
approach was rejected, the Commissioner lost his most effective weapon 
against the Iiquidation-reincorporation device. That defeat, in turn, led 
the Commissioner to press his attack through far less rational theories 
which, had they succeeded, would have materially disrupted the coher-
ence of subchapter C. 133 
132 Complete consistency, however, would not be obtained. A Zenz redemption 
can presumably occur, although the old stockholders emerge with stock having a 
value far less than 50 percent of the value of the old corporation. II the trans-
action were structured as a liquidation-reincorporation, that radical a shift in 
ownership would violate the continuity of interest test, thereby precluding re-
organization treatment. 
133 From as early as Gallagher v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 144 (1962), acq., 
reviewed (3 dis.), the Commissioner has argued that even if a Jiquidation-
reincorporation transaction did not amount to a reorganization, capital gains tax-
ation should be denied because the transaction also was not a complete liquidation 
within the meaning of § 331. That argument was accepted by the Tax Court in 
Telephone Answering Serv. Co., v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 423 (1974), reviewed 
(3 dis.), af]'d, 39 A.F.T.R. 2d (P-H) CJ 77-786 (4th Cir. Nov. 8, 1976), cert. 
denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977), and Casco Prods. Corp., 49 T.C. 32 (1967), re-
viewed (5 dis.). The court seemed relatively untroubled that its decisions in these 
cases determined what tax consequences were not available to the parties but gave 
not the slightest clue as to what tax consequences were available. The appellate 
courts have not concurred in this approach. For example, in Aetna Casualty & 
Surety Co. v. United States, N. 128 supra, the Second Circuit disapproved the rea-
soning in Casco and stated that the transaction was an F reorganization. 568 
F.2d at 822 n.13. 
More recently, the Commissioner has argued that the formation of a new 
corporation and the transfer of assets to it could be combined into a § 351 trans-
action. That argument has had little success in the courts. See, e.g., Stevens Pass, 
Inc. v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 532 (1967). However, the Commissioner has 
recently expanded this attack. Under Revenue Ruling 78-294, 1978-2 C.B. 141, 
the transaction described in Revenue Ruling 61-156 might now be regarded as a 
§ 351 exchange. Section 351, a nonrecognition provision closely related to the 
reorganization sections, is a poor second choice as the vehicle for attacking the 
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It is suggested here that the rules which emerge from a proper under-
standing of the relevance of fresh investment to the disposition of an 
interest in a corporation lead to a result that is both correct and reason-
able. And, of perhaps greater importance, the consistent application of 
these rules yields consistent treatment for comparable but quite differently 
structured transactions, thus furthering the rationality and coherence of 
the Code. 
Epilogue 
Three types of transactions have been considered. While they are 
structured quite differently, they have identical financial effects upon 
the parties involved. Moreover, the transactions are frequently viewed 
by taxpayers as alternative routes to a desired result and are chosen solely 
for their income tax consequences. It should not have been terribly sur-
prising to discover that under current law, each form of transaction is 
taxed very differently from the others. While regrettable, such incon-
sistency of treatment is not uncommon under the Code. What should be 
surprising, however, is that these inconsistent tax burdens are not re-
quired by the Code itself, but are attributable to inconsistent analysis of 
the significance of fresh investment in the three contexts. 
There is little basis for the hope that the bewildering complexity of the 
tax laws will ever be materially diminished through a simplification of 
the statutory detail. But the complexity, as well as the inappropriate tax 
burden, produced by simple misapplication of Code provisions can and 
must be reduced. It would be foolish to suggest that erroneous construc-
tions of the tax laws can be entirely eliminated or that they derive from 
a single identifiable cause. Courts will err and litigants on both sides will 
assert extreme positions that at times will prevail. Indeed, the positions 
criticized herein are in part attributable to a variety of causes ranging 
from good faith human error to excessive adversarial zeal. 
From the broadest perspective, however, the inconsistent analysis of 
comparable transactions is often attributable to an excessively narrow 
approach to the fashioning of rules of taxation. If rules are adopted by 
liquidation-reincorporation. Not only does such a use stretch the scope of the 
section beyond comprehensible limits, but § 351 lacks a dividend equivalence pro-
vision. Thus, even if the § 351 attack succeeds, all boot is entitled to capital gains 
taxation and the resulting corporation thereby obtains an upwards basis adjust-
ment for assets transferred to it. I.R.C. § 362(a). As a result, transactions brought 
within § 351 will receive substantially different treatment from that imposed 
upon transactions governed by the F reorganization, although the only difference 
between the transactions is the amount of fresh investment obtained. As stated 
repeatedly in the text, fresh investment properly docs not have such significance 
to the taxation of the old stockholders. 
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the Treasury, or by Congress and the courts, simply with a view to the 
expedient resolution of immediate problems and with inadequate con-
sideration of the consistency of the rules with other developed doctrines 
within the taxing system, anomalies such as those addressed herein will 
be unavoidable. Such myopia in the development of the taxing system 
could well create a law of unmanageable complexity. It has been demon-
stated here that, in at least some contexts, the consistent application of 
developed principles both is productive of a more rational taxing system 
and is an entirely practical objective. 
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